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Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the 
Alden Trilogy 
Carlos Manuel Vaizquezt 
On the last day of the Supreme Court's 1998 Term, the Justices 
delivered their opinions in Alden v. Maine' from the bench with great 
drama, reportedly holding spectators spellbound for close to an hour.2 The 
Court's holding in that case that the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
protects states from being sued in their own courts without their consent 
even on federal claims has been the subject of much commentary, most 
of it unfavorable.3 What has received less attention is that, in another 
decision handed down the same day, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
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School Faculty Colloquium and Georgetown Faculty Workshop-for their comments. I am also 
indebted to Peter KMason for outstanding research assistance. 
1. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999). 
2. See Linda Greenhouse, States Are Given New Legal Shield by Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 24, 1999, at Al. 
3. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searching for a Way To Enforce 
Federalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming Apr. 2000); Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a New 
Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the New Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
(forthcoming Mar. 2000); William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business, 
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2000); Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise 
in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2000) [hereinafter Jackson, Principle and 
Compromise]; Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity and the 
Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming Apr. 2000); William P. 
Marshall & Jason S. Cowart, State Immunity, Political Accountability, and Alden v. Maine, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2000); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: 
Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2000); John E. 
Nowak, The Gang of Five and the Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Supreme Court, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2000); John V. Orth, History and the Eleventh 
Amendment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2000); James E. Pfander, Once More 
unto the Breach: Eleventh Amendment Scholarship and the Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
(forthcoming Mar. 2000); Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
(forthcoming Mar. 2000); Jay Tidmarsh, A Dialogic Defense of Alden, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 
(forthcoming Mar. 2000); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2000); Michael Wells, Suing States for Money: 
Constitutional Remedies After Alden and Florida Prepaid, 31 RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming Apr. 
2000); Ann Woolhandler, Old Property, New Property, and Sovereign Immunity, 75 NoTRE 
DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2000). 
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Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,4 the Court reaffirmed a 
competing principle that may contain the seeds of Alden's substantial 
undoing. The Court in Florida Prepaid held that the states' sovereign 
immunity is subject to the Due Process Clause, which requires a state to 
provide a remedy to individuals when it willfully deprives them of liberty 
or property in violation of federal law. When property or liberty is at stake, 
in other words, the rule appears to be the opposite of what the Court held in 
Alden: The state is required to provide individuals a remedy in its own 
courts. 
How far the due process principle undoes the sovereign immunity 
principle depends in large part on how the Court defines "liberty" and 
" property." A third decision handed down that day, College Savings Bank 
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,' makes it 
clear that the concept of " property" is not so capacious as to undo Alden's 
sovereign immunity principle entirely. College Savings Bank holds that not 
all violations of federal statutes that entitle individuals to damages deprive 
individuals of property. But earlier precedent that the Court did not mention 
or purport to disturb indicates that "liberty" and "property," though not 
"infinite,"' are "broad and majestic" in scope.7 "In a Constitution for a 
free people," the Court has said, " there can be no doubt that the meaning of 
'liberty' must be broad indeed."8 And " [t]he Court has also made clear that 
the property interests protected by procedural due process extend well 
beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money." 9 Indeed, under 
these precedents, the due process principle appears to be broad enough to 
have required the opposite result in Alden itself, had the principle been 
invoked in that case. In other words, Florida Prepaid, in conjunction with 
extant precedent regarding the meaning of "property," suggests that the 
Due Process Clause required Maine to afford Alden the remedy that the 
Court in Alden held Maine would otherwise have been entitled to deny on 
sovereign immunity grounds. 
The claim that the principle reaffirmed in Florida Prepaid substantially 
undoes the principle articulated in Alden is of course in tension with the 
widespread belief that Alden was an important decision. The Alden majority 
itself at one point sought to downplay the practical significance of its 
4. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) [hereinafter eferred to in the text as Florida Prepaid]. 
5. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999) [hereinafter eferred to in the text as College Savings Bank]. 
College Savings Bank and Florida Prepaid originated as a single case, but the patent claims 
involved in Florida Prepaid were appealed to the Federal Circuit, while the claims involved in 
College Savings Bank were appealed to the Third Circuit. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2203 
n. 1. 
6. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972). 
7. Id. at571. 
8. Id. at 572. 
9. Id. at 571-72. 
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holding by pointing to mechanisms left open for enforcing the federal legal 
obligations of the states-mechanisms such as suits against the states by the 
federal government,10 private suits seeking prospective relief,11 and private 
suits seeking damages from state officials in their individual capacities.12 
These mechanisms, not to mention Congress's power to procure state 
waivers of immunity through its spending power, diminish the practical 
importance of Alden's holding that private damages actions against the 
states are unavailable in state as well as federal courts. But the majority's 
stated reasons for unconcern did not include the Due Process Clause's 
guarantee of a remedy against the states in certain cases. The claim that 
Florida Prepaid largely undoes Alden is also inconsistent with the 
apocalyptic nature of the remarks of the dissenting Justices, both in their 
opinions and from the bench. This Essay suggests that, if Alden is 
significant, its significance may lie in the changes that it portends for due 
process doctrine. If, under current understandings of " liberty" and 
" property," the due process principle largely undoes the sovereign 
immunity principle, Alden's strong articulation of the sovereign immunity 
principle may reflect a repudiation of those understandings. 
It is possible that the Court's decision in Alden reflects neither its 
conscious articulation of an insignificant sovereign immunity principle nor 
its intention to repudiate due process doctrine that would otherwise render 
its holding insignificant. A third possibility is that the Court decided these 
cases without fully working through the implications of its decision for 
collateral doctrine, even doctrine implicated in decisions handed down the 
same day.'3 If that is what happened, this failure to work through the 
10. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267 (1999). The Eleventh Amendment does not 
protect the states from suits in federal court brought by the federal government. See Principality of 
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1934). 
11. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). On the distinction 
between prospective and retrospective relief, see generally Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Night and 
Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in 
Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1 (1998). 
12. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267-68; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
13. That the Court did not think through its analysis of "property" in College Savings Bank 
with its usual rigor is suggested by the fact that much of this portion of its opinion appears to have 
been lifted from the Solicitor General's brief in the case, which " conceded" that the bank had not 
been deprived of a property interest. Compare College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2224 (1999) (stating that the "hallmark" of a 
property interest is the right to exclude others), and id. (stating that trademarks are property 
because others may be excluded from infringing them), and id. at 2225 (finding that the 
"misrepresentations concerning its own products intruded upon no interest over which petitioner 
had exclusive dominion"), with Brief for the United States as Petitioner, College Sav. Bank (No. 
98-149), available in 1999 WL 95503, at *31-32 (describing property as a bundle of rights with 
the most important being the right to exclude), and id. at *32 (stating that trademarks and other 
intellectual property are property because they include the right to exclude), and id. (stating that 
"misrepresentations concerning its own products effected no intrusion upon any tangible or 
intangible interest over which [College Savings Bank] possesses exclusive dominion"). If the 
decision in College Savings Bank does in fact signal the demise of the Court's "new property" 
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ramifications of one case for another may have been caused in part by the 
fact that (1) the three cases were briefed and argued separately by different 
lawyers, (2) each of the opinions in the trilogy was assigned to a different 
Justice, and (3) perhaps most importantly, the litigants in Alden failed to 
invoke the due process principle. 
Part I of this Essay examines what Alden tells us about the nature of 
state sovereign immunity. I conclude that the Court rejected the "forum- 
allocation" interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, and implicitly 
adopted what I have called the "immunity-from-liability" interpretation, 
under which the states are immune from being subjected to damage liability 
to individuals."4 College Savings Bank confirms that this is how the Court 
now understands state sovereign immunity. Part II discusses the nature of 
the due process principle reaffirmed in Florida Prepaid. I conclude that, 
although the due process regime contemplated in Florida Prepaid for 
remedying violations of liberty and property may differ from the forum- 
allocation regime in nontrivial ways, it is fair to characterize Florida 
Prepaid as a partial resurrection of the forum-allocation regime. Finally, I 
consider in Part III the extent to which last Term's decisions, primarily 
College Savings Bank, retreat from the broad definition of property that the 
Court had articulated in earlier cases. The Court's approach to property in 
College Savings Bank clearly reflects a change from its approach in past 
cases, but just how far the Court has retreated remains unclear, primarily 
because the reasons the Court gave for its conclusion that the College 
Savings Bank plaintiff was not suing to enforce a property interest were 
unpersuasive and internally inconsistent. 
If last Term's decisions do signal a dramatic narrowing of the scope 
of the property and liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, they 
show that the sovereign immunity tail is beginning to wag a very large 
due process dog. To accommodate its holdings denying individuals certain 
remedies against states, the Court may have substantially narrowed 
concepts that trigger very basic procedural rights. If these decisions do not 
reflect a conscious decision to move due process doctrine in this direction, 
the decisions' principal legacy may be a far more complex, and far less 
coherent, sovereign immunity and due process doctrine. Although 
jurisprudence, it is ironic that the death knell has been sounded in a case in which the government 
"conceded" the point, as the point was also conceded in the case most closely associated with 
"new" property, Goldberg v, Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See infra note 171 and accompanying 
text. (I have placed quotation marks around the term "conceded" because, while the 
government's position in Goldberg was a genuine concession, its position in College Savings 
Bank was not necessarily one. The federal government had an interest in having the Lanham Act 
upheld, but it also had an interest in narrowing the circumstances in which it would be required to 
provide due process.) 
14. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 
1683, 1700-08 (1997) (describing the "forum-allocation" and "immunity-from-liability" 
interpretations). 
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sovereign immunity doctrine has often been criticized as inconsistent with 
rule-of-law aspirations because it leaves some rights without corresponding 
remedies, the Court's latest decisions suggest that this doctrine's most 
problematic feature from a rule-of-law perspective may be its bewildering 
complexity. 
I. ALDEN AND THE ADOPTION OF THE IMMUNITY-FROM-LIABILITY VIEW 
In Hans v. Louisiana,15 the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment 
protects states from being sued in federal court even for violations of 
federal obligations. The holding has been controversial because of the rule- 
of-law problem it appears to create."6 The Eleventh Amendment, so 
interpreted, appears to violate two related requirements of the rule-of-law 
ideal: that there be a legal remedy for the violation of a legal right,17 
and that the judicial power be coextensive with the legislative.18 The 
Constitution imposes numerous legal obligations on the states and 
gives Congress the power to impose additional ones, but the Eleventh 
Amendment, as interpreted in Hans, protects the states from being sued by 
private parties in the federal courts for violating such obligations. Scholars 
and dissenting Justices have argued that the Eleventh Amendment, properly 
construed, limits Article III's diversity grants of jurisdiction insofar as 
they confer jurisdiction in certain suits against states, but does not limit 
the grant of federal-question jurisdiction,19 and that Hans was accordingly 
wrongly decided. If so interpreted, the Eleventh Amendment would be 
unproblematic from a rule-of-law perspective. The Court came close 
to overruling Hans in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public 
Transportation,20 and in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas21 it arguably did 
15. 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). 
16. See Vdzquez, supra note 14, at 1686. 
17. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
18. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818-19 (1824); THE 
FEDERALIST No. 81, at 451-52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
19. This is the so-called diversity interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. See Welch v. 
Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 497-98 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 301 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 443, 494-95 (1989); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 
1425, 1475-84 (1987); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a 
Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh 
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 2004 
(1983); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign 
Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1988); James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An 
"Explanatory " Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1269, 1273 (1998). 
20. 483 U.S. 468 (1987). The Court, with Justice Scalia reserving judgment, was evenly 
divided on whether to embrace the diversity interpretation. 
21. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
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overrule Hans, for all practical purposes,22 when it held that Congress has 
the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to Article I. 
But the Court emphatically reaffirmed Hans three Terms ago when it 
overruled Union Gas in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.23 According to the 
majority in Seminole Tribe, Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but not pursuant to " antecedent provisions of the Constitution." 24 
Until the past Term, a different line of cases promised a different, but 
nearly as satisfying, escape from the rule-of-law problems posed by Hans. 
Relying on Cohens v. Virginia,25 in which the Supreme Court held that the 
Eleventh Amendment does not limit the Supreme Court's appellate 
jurisdiction over cases against states litigated in the state courts, even if the 
state did not consent to federal review, scholars had read the Court's 
Eleventh Amendment cases as establishing that the amendment grants 
merely an immunity from the original jurisdiction of the federal courts.26 
On this view, which had become known as the "forum-allocation" view, 
neither the Eleventh Amendment nor any other principle of state sovereign 
immunity having constitutional stature has any bearing on the remedies to 
which states are subject if they violate federal law. The Eleventh 
Amendment protects states from suits in federal court by private parties 
seeking certain types of remedies, but that just means that persons 
aggrieved by state violations of federal law must seek those remedies in 
state courts. Under the Supremacy Clause, the state courts must entertain 
suits seeking such remedies, and if they fail to afford the remedy required 
by federal law (a matter unaffected by sovereign immunity under this 
theory), the U.S. Supreme Court may reverse their judgments. 
22. In an apparent attempt o garner Justice White's vote, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion 
did not rely on the diversity theory. Instead, in reliance on Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 
184 (1964), the plurality concluded that the states consented to congressional abrogation of their 
sovereign immunity under Article I when they joined the Union. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 14- 
15 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). For an explanation of how this holding gutted Hans, see id. at 
35-42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and Vazquez, supra note 14, at 1698- 
99. Justice White voted with the plurality, but he did not join the plurality opinion. Instead, he 
wrote cryptically that, while he agreed with the plurality's conclusion, he did not agree with all of 
its reasoning. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 45 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
In later overruling Union Gas, the Court relied in part on the absence of a stated rationale that the 
majority of the Court agreed upon. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996). 
23. 517 U.S.44. 
24. Id. at 66 (quoting Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part)). 
25. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 392 (1821). 
26. See Jackson, supra note 19, at 15. According to Professor Jackson, even the forum- 
allocation interpretation is too broad. See id. at 74. In her view, the Eleventh Amendment's forum- 
allocation function should be understood as a rule of federal common law, alterable by the 
Congress. See id. at 74-75. 
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The Supreme Court appeared to embrace this theory in three cases. In 
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco,27 the Court 
unanimously reaffirmed the holding of Cohens that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over 
suits brought against the states in state courts, even if the state does not 
consent to Supreme Court review. The Court in McKesson held in addition 
that the Due Process Clause sometimes requires the states to afford 
remedies in their own courts that the Eleventh Amendment would preclude 
the federal courts from awarding,28 and in Reich v. Collins,29 the Court, 
unanimously again, made it clear that when the Due Process Clause 
requires the remedy, the Supremacy Clause vitiates any claim of sovereign 
immunity in the state courts. Finally, in Hilton v. South Carolina Public 
Railways Commission,30 a majority of the Court affirmed that the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act (FELA)31 subjects states to monetary liability 
even though the Eleventh Amendment protects states from private damage 
suits in federal court under that statute. The Court said that "the Eleventh 
Amendment does not apply in state courts,"32 and that when "a federal 
statute does impose liability upon the States, the Supremacy Clause makes 
that statute the law in every State, fully enforceable in state court." 33 
In Alden, however, the Court directly addressed the forum-allocation 
view and definitively rejected it.34 The plaintiffs, employees of the State 
of Maine, claimed that the state had violated their federally guaranteed 
right to a minimum wage.35 Congress had made it clear in amendments 
to the Fair Labor Standards Act that states not only were required to pay 
the minimum wage, but also could be sued by employees in federal 
and state courts for alleged violations.36 The plaintiffs had brought suit 
in federal court before the Court decided in Seminole Tribe that Congress 
lacked the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant 
to its Article I powers. Soon after the Seminole Tribe decision, the 
district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that Congress had enacted 
the FLSA under its Commerce Clause Power,37 and the court of appeals 
27. 496 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1990). This holding was reaffirmed unanimously last Term in South 
Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama, 119 S. Ct. 1180 (1999). 
28. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 31. 
29. 513 U.S. 106, 109-13 (1994). 
30. 502 U.S. 197, 207 (1991). 
31. 45 U.S.C. ?? 51-60 (1994). 
32. Hilton, 502 U.S. at 205 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63- 
64 (1989)). 
33. Id. at 207. 
34. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2260-62 (1999). 
35. See id. at 2246. 
36. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
37. See Mills v. Maine, No. 92-410-P-H, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9985, at *7 (D. Me. July 3, 
1996). 
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affirmed.38 The employees then brought the same suit in state court, arguing 
that the Eleventh Amendment protected the state only from being sued in 
federal court, and that the Supremacy Clause required the state to entertain 
the congressionally created cause of action and to afford the 
congressionally created remedy of backpay, notwithstanding the sovereign 
immunity it would otherwise enjoy.39 The state moved to dismiss the suit on 
the ground that, under Maine law, the state is immune from this sort of 
action.40 The Maine trial court dismissed the lawsuit on sovereign immunity 
grounds,41 and a divided Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.42 
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, with the same four Justices 
dissenting as in Seminole Tribe.43 Contrary to some of the commentary 
immediately following the decision,' Alden does not call into question the 
validity of primary obligations imposed by Congress on states. The Court 
noted, and even relied on, its prior holding that the FLSA is " binding" on 
the states even though states remain immune from "private suit to recover 
under that Act."45 The fact that the states enjoy sovereign immunity, the 
Court stressed, "does not confer upon [them] a concomitant right to 
disregard the Constitution or valid federal law."46 Indeed, one of the 
Court's principal points was that the existence of a valid "substantive 
federal law" -by which the Court evidently meant a law that validly 
imposes primary obligations on the states-does not vitiate a claim of 
sovereign immunity.47 " [T]he question is not the primacy of federal law but 
the implementation of the law in a manner consistent with the constitutional 
sovereignty of the States."48 Thus, the states remain obligated to pay the 
38. See Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 55 (1st Cir. 1997). 
39. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. 
42. See Alden v. State, 1998 Me. 200, ? 11. A majority of four justices agreed that the state 
was protected by its sovereign immunity, see id. ? 1, while two dissenters would have held that 
the FLSA preempted any claim of sovereign immunity by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, see id. 
?14. 
43. Compare Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269 (dissenting opinions), with Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, 76, 100 (1996) (dissenting opinions). 
44. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Permission To Litigate: Sovereign Immunity Lets States 
Decide Who Can Sue Them, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999, at 42; The Supreme Court: Activism in 
Different Robes, ECONOMIST, July 3, 1999, at 22. 
45. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2255 (citing Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. 
Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 283 (1973)). 
46. Id. at 2266. 
47. Id. at 2255. 
48. Id. at 2255-56. 
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minimum wage.49 Sovereign immunity merely bars certain (but not all) 
means of enforcing this obligation.50 
If the states' sovereign immunity is fully compatible with congressional 
imposition of primary obligations on states, from what exactly does this 
immunity protect states? Under the forum-allocation view, sovereign 
immunity protects states only from the original jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. Congress retains the power to impose primary obligations on states 
and to subject them to private damage liability to individuals injured by 
violations. State courts are in turn obligated by the Supremacy Clause to 
entertain such actions. The Court in Alden clearly rejected that theory. 
Although it is less clear from the Alden opinion that it adopted what I have 
called the immunity-from-liability view, the opinion is susceptible to such 
an interpretation, and College Savings Bank confirms that the Court now 
adheres to the imrmunity-from-liability view.51 
Under the immunity-from-liability view, Congress lacks the power to 
subject states to damage liability to individuals for violations of federal 
statutes. The federal obligations of the states may still be enforced 
prospectively in private suits against individual officers, and state officers 
may be liable to individuals for damages in their individual capacities,52 but 
the states themselves may not be subjected to such liability. The majority in 
Alden never declared that the states were free from liability to individuals. 
Instead, it purported to hold only "that the States retain immunity from 
private suit in their own courts."53 At a number of points in the majority 
opinion, the Court described another possible immunity of states-a 
broader immunity from "Congress' power to subject States to private suits" 
regardless of the forum.54 Although in the end, it did not expressly adopt the 
latter interpretation of state sovereign immunity, some of the support it 
cited for its holding would support this broader interpretation as well.55 But 
49. The Constitution does limit the federal government's power to impose obligations on the 
states, see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 162 (1992), but the sovereign immunity cases do not concern this sort of limit. 
50. See infra text accompanying note 80. In this respect, the Court's more recent decision in 
Kimel v. Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000), offers a striking contrast. As has become 
customary, the Court noted at the end of its opinion that its holding does not leave persons in the 
plaintiffs' position entirely without a remedy. See id. at 650. See generally Vdzquez, supra note 3 (giving examples of similar statements in past decisions). But, rather than emphasize that the 
federal obligations imposed by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.A. 
?? 621-634 (West Supp. 1999), remained binding on states and enforceable against them in suits 
by the federal government or in private suits against state officials for prospective relief, the Court 
in Kimel merely noted that state laws protect state employees against age discrimination. See 
Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 650. 
51. See infra text accompanying notes 82-93. 
52. On these alternative mechanisms for enforcing the federal obligations of the states, see 
generally Vdzquez, supra note 3. 
53. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266 (emphasis added). 
54. Id. at 2259. 
55. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. 
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even in this broader articulation, the Court described the immunity as an 
immunity from " suits," not an immunity from liability as such. 
Is the Court's holding nevertheless necessarily a holding that states are 
immune from congressionally imposed liability to individuals? In the light 
of its earlier holding that states are immune from private damage suits in 
federal court for violation of statutes enacted under Article I, is its holding 
in Alden that states are also entitled to immunity from such suits in their 
own courts tantamount to a holding that states are immune from private 
damage liability? There appear to be two possible ways to escape this 
conclusion. First, the Court did not expressly overrule its holding in Nevada 
v. Hall56 that states do not enjoy any constitutional immunity from suits in 
the courts of sister states. In the light of Hall, the narrow holding that states 
are immune from congressionally imposed private suits in their own courts 
would in theory be consistent with the existence of a federal liability that 
could be enforced against the states without their consent in the courts of 
sister states.57 This possibility would appear to be excluded by the broader 
view-not expressly embraced in Alden-that the states' immunity is an 
immunity from being subjected by Congress to private damage suits "in 
any forum." 58 But even under this broader formulation, according to Alden, 
states are immune only from " suits."" At least in theory, they may remain 
subject to private damage liability. I shall discuss in turn these two possible 
ways to escape the conclusion that, after Alden, states are immune from 
federally imposed damage liability to individuals. 
In Hall, the California courts entertained an action against the State of 
Nevada based on California law and refused to give effect to a Nevada law 
protecting the state from liability beyond a certain amount.59 The Court held 
that nothing in the federal Constitution protected Nevada from such a suit 
or required California to recognize Nevada's law concerning sovereign 
immunity.60 Hall thus leaves open the possibility that the states' federal 
obligations may be enforced against them through private suits in the courts 
56. 440 U.S. 410 (1979). 
57. Because states may not discriminate against claims based on federal law, see McKnett v. 
St. L. & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 234 (1934), if states are indeed subject to such liability, then state 
courts may be constitutionally required to entertain suits against sister states based on federal law 
if they entertain suits against sister states based on analogous state laws. The "valid excuse" 
exception, however, would appear to permit states to deny their own courts jurisdiction over suits 
against sister states based on federal law even if they consent to suits against themselves based on 
the same federal law. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 369 (1990) (quoting Douglas v. New Y., 
N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1929)); cf Jackson, Principle and Compromise, supra 
note 3 (suggesting that Alden means that states can insist on sovereign immunity in their own 
courts in suits based on federal law even if they have consented to analogous state-law claims); 
infra note 68 (suggesting that Hall may permit suits against sister states only if states waive their 
own immunity from similar suits). 
58. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2262. 
59. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 412-13. 
60. See id. at 426. 
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of sister states. Indeed, if State A does subject State B to private damage 
suits for violation of federal law, State B may be required under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause to enforce State A's judgment against it.6" Alden 
could be interpreted to hold otherwise,62 but the Court in Alden 
distinguished Reich v. Collins as a suit in which the " obligation arises from 
the Constitution itself' and did not involve "the power of Congress to 
subject States to suits in their own courts." 63 The Court could thus 
conceivably hold that just as the states' entitlement to sovereign immunity 
in their own courts is subject to the remedial requirements of the Due 
Process Clause, so too is it subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
Although Hall does leave open this mechanism for enforcing a 
federally created liability of the states, I shall not dwell on this possible 
ground for concluding that the Court did not embrace the immunity-from- 
liability view. First, Alden itself suggests that Hall may not survive long. 
Although the Court in the end phrased its holding narrowly (apparently 
because of 'Hall), some of the support it cited for its holding is as 
inconsistent with Hall as with the position urged by the plaintiffs in the 
case. For example, the Court relied on a number of cases making the 
"sweeping" statement that states cannot be sued by individuals without 
their consent.' It also relied on its statement in Beers v. Arkansas that "[i]t 
is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the 
sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its 
consent and permission."6 Even more to the point was its quotation from 
Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick Railroad that " [i]t may be accepted as 
a point of departure unquestioned, that neither a State nor the United States 
can be sued as defendant in any court in this country without their 
consent." 66 Finally, the Court stressed " 'the indignity of subjecting a State 
to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private 
parties,' regardless of the forum."67 These passages suggest that the 
constitutional immunity recognized in Alden protects states from being sued 
in the courts of sister states without their consent.68 
61. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, ? 1. 
62. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266 (" [W]e hold that the States retain immunity from private 
suit in their own courts ...."). 
63. Id. at 2259. As discussed further below, the Reich case, and indeed the Court's decision 
the same day in Florida Prepaid, do appear to be cases in which, in a sense, Congress is 
subjecting states to suit in their own courts. See infra notes 136-139 and accompanying text. 
64. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2262 (citing Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 
51 (1944); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 506 (1887); Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 
541 (1876); Briscoe v. Bank of Ky., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257, 321-22 (1837)). 
65. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2262 (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858)) (emphasis added). 
66. Id. (quoting Cunningham v. Macon & B.R., 109 U.S. 446,451 (1883)) (emphasis added). 
67. Id. at 2264 (quoting Ayers, 123 U.S. at 505) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
68. Moreover, if sister states were required to enforce in their own courts private judgments 
obtained against them in the courts of sister states, Hall would also appear to conflict with the 
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Second, Alden would be consistent with the immunity-from-liability 
view even if the Court did not overrule Hall or hold that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause does not extend to suits to enforce a sister-state judgment in a 
state's own courts. Hall leaves open a private remedy against states for 
violations of federal law, but the remedy would exist if and only if a sister 
state recognized it. A remedy that exists only by virtue of its recognition by 
another state would appear to be a state remedy, not a federal remedy. A 
suit under Hall seeking a remedy for the violation of federal law does not 
seek to enforce a liability "imposed" by federal law. Even under the 
broadest interpretation of Hall, therefore, states could still be said to be 
immune from federal damage liability to individuals.69 
To be sure, my rejection of this first rationale for denying that Alden 
embraces the immunity-from-liability view depends on a particular 
conception of what it means to be under a legal liability. A second possible 
way to reconcile Alden with the existence of a congressionally imposed 
liability of states to individuals would be simply to deny that the existence 
of a federal " liability" requires the availability of a compulsive " suit" to 
enforce the liability. For example, it is recognized that nations may be 
" responsible" to other nations for their violations of international aw even 
though no judicial forum exists in which the injured state may maintain an 
action against the responsible state without the latter's consent. Justice 
Holmes said in The Western Maid that " legall obligations that exist but 
cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to 
the grasp."70 Perhaps the federal liability exists in the ghostly fashion 
described by Holmes even though the states' sovereign immunity prevents 
its enforcement without the states' consent. The care taken by the Alden 
Alden Court's emphasis on the importance of allowing states to control their own treasuries. See 
Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264. Congress could expose all state treasuries to private "raids" merely by 
persuading a single state of the wisdom of the federal policy. Cf id. at 2250 (quoting DAVID P. 
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION I  CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at 196 (1997)) 
(expressing concern about private raids on state treasuries); United States Supreme Court 
Transcript, Alden (No. 98-436), available in 1999 WL 216178, at *21-22 (same). Congress might 
even be able to achieve this goal without persuading any state of the wisdom of the federal 
policy-for example, by offering a state federal money if it agrees to subject itself and sister states 
to private damage suits in its courts. (The Court in Hall noted that California had "unequivocally 
waived its own immunity from liability for the torts" to which it was subjecting Nevada, 
suggesting that a state would not be free to preserve its own immunity while subjecting sister 
states to liability on the same cause of action. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 (1979).) 
Since states are not persons for purposes of the Due Process Clause, see Republic of Argentina v. 
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966), a state could apparently authorize its courts to entertain suits against sister states without 
regard to the existence of "minimum contacts." See generally International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Nor would the dormant Commerce Clause pose an obstacle, 
since by hypothesis Congress will have " authorized" any such burden on interstate commerce. 
69. This is why I have never regarded Hall as inconsistent with the immunity-from-liability 
theory. See Vdzquez, supra note 14, at 1700 n.77, 1711 n.131. 
70. 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922). 
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Court not to characterize its holding as an immunity from liability suggests 
that the majority may have viewed it that way. 
But I doubt that even Holmes would regard such obligations as legal 
ones.7" In any event, it appears that the Framers would not have regarded an 
obligation of a state that cannot be enforced without the state's consent as a 
legal one. The Framers distinguished a law from a " mere treaty" in that the 
latter depended for its efficacy on the good faith of the parties.72 The 
statements by Hamilton and others relied on by the Court in Hans and later 
in Seminole Tribe equate the existence of sovereign immunity with the 
absence of a right of action-indeed, the absence of a primary legal duty.73 
For example, Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 81 that 
there is no color to pretend that the State governments would, by 
adoption of [the Constitution], be divested of the privilege of 
paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint 
but that which flows from the obligations of good faith. The 
contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the 
conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a 
compulsive force. They confer no right of action independent of the 
sovereign will.74 
Because of the states' immunity, individuals had no "right of action" 
against the states. Because the states' contracts depended for their efficacy 
on the states' good faith, they lacked "compulsive force." In other words, 
they did not create legal obligations at all.75 
If anything emerges with clarity from the convention and ratification 
debates, it is that the Framers did not rely on the states' good faith to secure 
the efficacy of the federal obligations of the states. Such reliance was, 
indeed, the chief problem with the Articles of Confederation and the 
principal reason the Framers decided to write a new constitution: 
There was a time when we were told that breaches by the States of 
the regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected; that 
a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the 
71. The statement, after all, appears in an opinion concluding that a ship that negligently 
caused another ship injury while being operated by the sovereign did not incur any liability as a 
result. 
72. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 18, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton). 
73. See also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Blatchford v. Native 
Village, 501 U.S. 775 (1991); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). 
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 18, at 456 (Alexander Hamilton). 
75. See Hamilton's statement in The Federalist No. 33 that a "mere treaty," unlike a law, is 
"dependent on the good faith of the parties," id. at 172, and Gouverneur Morris's statement hat, 
unlike "a mere compact resting on the good faith of the parties," a "national, supreme, 
Govt.... [has] a compleat and compulsive operation," 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 34 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). 
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respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all the 
constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the 
present day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now 
hear from the same quarter will be thought, when we shall have 
received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, 
experience. It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs 
by which human conduct is actuated, and belied the original 
inducements to the establishment of civil power. Why has 
government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will 
not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without 
76 constraint. 
This history is difficult to square with one of the reasons the Alden 
Court gave in support of its holding: 
We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the 
Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United States. The 
good faith of the States thus provides an important assurance that 
" [t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof .., shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land."77 
The Court's invocation of "good faith" as a mechanism for securing 
the status of the states' federal obligations as "Law of the Land" offers 
some basis for thinking that the Court regarded the states as being under a 
federal legal liability to individuals even though their sovereign immunity 
precluded the enforcement of this liability without their consent.78 But this 
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, supra note 18, at 78 (Alexander Hamilton). For additional 
citations, see Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1097-101 (1992). 
77. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI). 
78. The Court's failure to overrule its decision in Hilton may offer further support for this 
view. As noted above, the Court in Hilton held that FELA did subject states to "monetary 
liability" to individuals. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 207 
(1991). In Alden, the Court interpreted Hilton as having turned on the states' consent to being 
sued in their own courts under FELA. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2258. If the Court embraces both 
views, then perhaps it does believe that states can be said to be subject to a federal legal liability, 
even if that liability can be enforced against them only if they consent. Cf Vdzquez, supra note 
14, at 1788-89 (anticipating the Alden holding and suggesting that the Court might reconcile such 
a holding with Hilton by denying that a legal obligation must be enforceable without consent, but 
rejecting that position as incompatible with the Framers' view of law). But Alden appears to reject 
at least some aspects of the Court's analysis in Hilton. For example, the Court in Hilton had 
viewed the issue before it as whether states were entitled to "immunity from state-court suit" 
under FELA, 502 U.S. at 203, and it held that they were not entitled to such immunity, stating that 
" when ... a federal statute does impose a liability on the States, the Supremacy Clause makes that 
statute the law in every State, fully enforceable in state court," id. at 207. Alden holds that states 
are entitled to immunity from state-court suit under statutes like FELA, and hence such statutes 
are not "fully enforceable" against the states in state courts. If Alden requires a rejection of these 
aspects of Hilton, then there appears to be little reason to believe that the Court still adheres to the 
notion that FELA imposes "monetary liability" on the states. 
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invocation is highly problematic precisely because it conflicts so directly 
with the Framers' understanding of what it means for an obligation to have 
legal status. 
In the end, however, the Court's confidence in the states' good faith 
appears to have played a negligible role in its analysis. The quoted passage 
refers to the primary obligations imposed by federal law on the states, not 
the remedial obligations. Although the expected good faith of the states 
gave the majority some comfort, the Court went on to recognize that 
the efficacy of these obligations does not rest on good faith. The Court 
stressed as well that "the plan of the Convention" included mechanisms 
for enforcing federal obligations even against recalcitrant states.79 These 
mechanisms include suits by the federal government or by sister states 
in federal court, suits against state officials by private parties seeking 
prospective relief, and suits by private parties seeking damages from state 
officials.80 The Court concluded that these mechanisms provided sufficient 
assurance that the federal obligations of the states would be effective, while 
offering due protection to the states' dignity and their treasuries.8" The 
Court's reliance on these compulsory mechanisms to enforce the primary 
obligations is consistent with the idea that those obligations are legally 
binding on the states (in the Framers' sense) even though the states remain 
immune from private damage liability under federal law. On the other hand, 
the claim that a liability of states to private individuals exists as a legal 
matter even though it cannot be enforced by such individuals without the 
states' consent is inconsistent with the Court's ultimate recognition (and the 
Framers' clear view) that compulsory mechanisms of enforcement are 
necessary to give efficacy to legal obligations of states-indeed, to give 
such obligations the status of "law." If law is by its nature compulsory, 
then a liability that depends on the good faith of those subject to the norm is 
not a legal liability. 
Although Alden may be equivocal in this regard, the decision the same 
day in College Savings Bank establishes that the Court has embraced 
the immunity-from-liability view, even if the Court does not yet fully 
realize it. College Savings Bank involved the constitutionality of Congress's 
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in the Lanham Act. Under 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,82 Congress may abrogate this immunity pursuant to its 
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, but under Seminole Tribe, it 
may not abrogate pursuant to its Article I powers.83 In the Lanham Act, 
Congress abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity on the 
79. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267. 
80. See id. at 2267-68. 
81. See id. at 2268. 
82. 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976). 
83. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996). 
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theory that the Act creates property rights that are protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The plaintiff in College 
Savings Bank argued that the abrogation was valid on this theory, but the 
argument foundered at the first step. The plaintiff was complaining about 
the defendant's false advertising of its own products. The Court held that, 
while the Lanham Act may create some rights that count as property for 
purposes of the Due Process Clause, such as the rights protected by a 
trademark,84 the right that the plaintiff was claiming-the right to be free 
from pecuniary injury caused by a competitor's false advertising of its own 
product-is not a property right.85 
The Court's treatment of the concept of property under the Due Process 
Clause is the focus of Part III. For now, the important point is that the Court 
completely ignored another right that the plaintiff was claiming: the right to 
damages from the defendant for alleged false advertising.86 Congress 
clearly purported to establish such a right in the Lanham Act.87 The Court's 
precedents establish that a chose in action is a property right.88 A chose in 
action is a "right to recover .., money."89 The Court's failure to consider 
the plaintiff's right to damages is explicable on the theory that Congress 
lacked the power to confer such a right. And this, in turn, is explicable 
on the theory that, in the light of Alden and Seminole Tribe, sovereign 
immunity protects states from being subjected by Congress to damage 
liability to individuals. 
The other possibility is that a federal liability exists but cannot be 
enforced without the state's consent. But if such a " liability" were deemed 
a legal one, it would be unclear why the corresponding right to damages 
would not count as a property right for due process purposes. One answer 
may be that even if a right to damages is a " legal" right, it is not a property 
right unless the rightholder also has the capacity to enforce it in court. An 
alternative definition of "chose in action" is a "right of bringing an 
84. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 
2219, 2224 (1999). 
85. See id. at 2225. 
86. See id. at 2224-25. 
87. See 15 U.S.C. ? 1122(b) (1994). 
88. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 804 (1996) (noting that a "chose in 
action" is a "protected property interest in its own right"); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 
U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (" [A] chose in action is a constitutionally recognized property 
interest ...."). 
89. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 219 (5th ed. 1979); see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *397 ("Thus money due on a bond is a chose in action...."); THOMAS 
BLOUNT, NoMo-LExICON: A LAW-DICTIONARY (London, Thomas Newcomb 1670) ("Chose in 
action is a thing incorporeal and onely a right, as an annuity, obligation for Debt ...." ); 1 JOHN 
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 227 (Philadelphia, Childs & Peterson 1856) (defining chose in 
action as a right " to receive or recover a debt, or money, or damages for breach of contract, or for 
a tort connected with contract"). 
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action."90 Perhaps the Court would say that the cases recognizing that a 
chose in action is property use the term in this second sense and thus merely 
restate the well-established principle that a cause of action is a property 
right.91 Thus, it might be argued, the plaintiff in College Savings Bank had a 
legal right to damages but lacked a property right because, in the light of 
Alden, it lacked the power to bring the state into court. Florida Prepaid, 
however, establishes that a person may have a property right against the 
state even if sovereign immunity prevents the individual from maintaining 
an action for damages against the state without its consent. The Court's 
failure even to consider whether the right to damages created by Congress 
qualifies as a property right, even if it is unenforceable in court, suggests 
that the Court understood its holding in Alden as negating any such right. 
That, at any rate, appears to be how the majority in College Savings 
Bank understood its holding, for it expressly described the issue in the case 
as whether " Congress can make Florida liable to private parties for false or 
misleading advertising."92 Thus, the Court did not consider whether the 
right to damages that Congress created was a basis for abrogating the state's 
sovereign immunity on a due process theory, because, in its view, such 
liability is exactly what sovereign immunity protects the states from. That is 
the immunity-from-liability view.93 
90. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 89, at 219; see also BLOUNT, supra note 89 
(" [G]enerally all Causes of Suit for any Debt or Duty, Trespass or Wrong, are to be accounted 
Choses in action."). 
91. See, e.g., Tulsa Prof 1 Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (finding a 
property right in a cause of action against an estate for an unpaid bill); Logan v. Zimmerman 
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429-30 (1982) (finding a property right to use the adjudicatory 
mechanism of a fair labor act); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313 
(1950) (defining as property the right to have a trustee "answer for negligent or illegal 
impairments of [one's] interests"); In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 
820 F.2d 982, 988-89 (9th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that a cause of action is a "species of 
property"); Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 240 (1983) (Kozinski, C.J.) 
(finding a property right in a claim for the difference between the terms of a settlement and the 
amount the plaintiff believed the claim was worth). 
92. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 
2230 (1999) (emphasis added). 
93. Characterizing state sovereign immunity as an immunity from liability may seem strained 
in the light of Congress's apparent power to establish a system under which the federal 
government sues to recover money from states that have violated federal law and turns the money 
over to the individuals injured as a result of the violation. Can it be said that states are immune 
from "liability" under such a regime? I have characterized state sovereign immunity as an 
immunity from liability to individuals, as did the Court in College Savings Bank. But perhaps it 
would be more accurate to say that state sovereign immunity denies individuals the legal right to 
damages, in the sense that they lack the capacity to enforce any entitlement o such damages. See 
generally Vdzquez, supra note 76, at 1089-91. 
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II. FLORIDA PREPAID AND THE PARTIAL RESURRECTION OF THE 
FORUM-ALLOCATION VIEW 
On the same day that it adopted the immunity-from-liability view in 
Alden, the Court appears to have partially resurrected the forum-allocation 
view with respect to a subset of congressionally imposed obligations of the 
states: those that give rise to correlative "property" rights within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause. Indeed, in some respects, the states' 
remedial obligations under the Due Process Clause are broader than their 
remedial obligations under the forum-allocation view. Under the latter 
view, the states would have been required to entertain private damage 
actions in their own courts if Congress created a right to damages. Florida 
Prepaid appears to hold that, with respect to congressionally created 
property rights, states are obligated to provide an adequate remedy to 
individuals even if Congress has not created a damages remedy. As long as 
Congress has imposed a primary obligation that gives rise to a "property" 
right, the Due Process Clause itself requires the states to provide an 
adequate remedy. 
The plaintiff in Florida Prepaid was the College Savings Bank, the 
same bank that was the plaintiff in College Savings Bank. It alleged that the 
defendant, an agency of the State of Florida, had infringed its patent rights, 
and it sued for damages in federal court.94 The patent laws give the federal 
courts exclusive jurisdiction over infringement claims.95 In 1992, Congress 
abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal 
court.96 At that time, the Court had not yet overruled its holding in 
Union Gas that Congress possesses the power to abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity pursuant to its Article I legislative powers.97 But, 
perhaps anticipating Union Gas's demise, Congress justified the abrogation 
of Eleventh Amendment immunity as an "enforcement" of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.98 Its theory was that patent rights are " property" rights within 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and 
accordingly an abrogation of state immunity from federal jurisdiction was a 
valid measure to " enforce" the state's obligations under that clause.99 
Florida did not deny that patents were property. Instead, it urged the 
Court to hold that Congress lacks the power to abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity to "enforce" the states' obligations under the Due 
Process Clause with respect to "property" rights created by Congress under 
94. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 
2199, 2223. 
95. See 28 U.S.C. ? 1338 (1994). 
96. See 35 U.S.C. ? 296 (1994). 
97. The Court overruled Union Gas in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
98. See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 7-8 (1992). 
99. See id.; see also Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208 n.7. 
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Article L*1" Allowing Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity to enforce 
the states' obligations regarding property rights created under Article I, 
Florida argued, would circumvent the holding in Seminole Tribe that 
Congress lacks the power to abrogate immunity pursuant to Article JL*0 
Rejecting that argument, the Court expressly recognized that Congress has 
the power to abrogate sovereign immunity to enforce the states' due process 
obligations concerning property rights that it has created under Article 1.102 
But, the Court held, a state deprivation of the plaintiff's property right 
is not a sufficient predicate for an abrogation of sovereign immunity. 
The Court reiterated its holding in City of Boerne v. Flores103 that 
Congress's power under Section 5 is "'remedial' in nature,"' ' and said 
that an abrogation of sovereign immunity is "appropriate" legislation 
under Section 5 only if it is " tailor[ed] . . . to remedying or 
preventing ... conduct" that "transgress[es] the Fourteenth Amendment's 
substantive provisions." 105 Congress said that it had abrogated the states' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from patent-infringement suits to enforce 
the Due Process Clause, but that clause, the Court stressed, does not 
prohibit deprivations of property; it prohibits such deprivations only if 
accomplished "without due process of law." Citing earlier procedural due 
process decisions, the Court emphasized that a state can sometimes satisfy 
its obligation to provide " due process" by providing an adequate remedy in 
its own courts.'06 The Court struck down Congress's abrogation of 
sovereign immunity from patent-infringement claims for two reasons: First, 
Congress lacked sufficient evidence that states were both infringing 
federally protected patent rights and failing to provide the "adequate" 
remedy required by the Due Process Clause; and second, it did not limit the 
abrogation to cases involving "unremedied patent infringements by the 
States." 107 
For present purposes, the most interesting aspect of Florida Prepaid is 
not its holding that Congress may abrogate sovereign immunity to 
"enforce" the guarantee of procedural due process, but rather its holding 
regarding what the Due Process Clause requires in the first place. The 
Court's recognition that the Due Process Clause requires the states to 
provide an adequate remedy to individuals when the states "deprive" them 
100. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208. 
101. In support of this argument, Florida relied on Vdzquez, supra note 14, at 1744-46. See 
Brief for Petitioners, Florida Prepaid (No. 98-53 1), available in 1999 WL 86846, at *19. 
102. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208. 
103. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
104. Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2206. 
105. Id. at 2207. 
106. See id. at 2208-09 (relying on Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990); Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); and Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)). 
107. Id. at 2207 (emphasis added). 
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of property rights created by Congress threatens a substantial resurrection 
of the forum-allocation view. 
The resurrection is incomplete for two reasons. First, it applies only to 
"property" and "liberty" rights. The opinion in College Savings Bank 
makes it clear that not all federally imposed obligations are "property" 
rights. The Court did not say anything about liberty, but presumably the 
Court does not regard all federal rights as liberty for purposes of the Due 
Process Clause. The present contours of the concept of "property" are the 
principal subject of Part III. Second, the Due Process Clause requires a 
remedy only when the state has ""deprived" people of property rights. The 
Court in Florida Prepaid stressed that a "deprivation" occurs only when 
the state acts intentionally.108 Neither Florida Prepaid nor the decisions on 
which it relies offer much guidance about the precise mental state that 
produces a "deprivation," but it is clear that negligent injuries to property 
do not implicate the Due Process Clause and thus do not require an 
"adequate" remedy. 
The opinion in Florida Prepaid also leaves it unclear what an 
"adequate" remedy is. It seems clear that the Court is contemplating 
monetary relief.'09 It is also clear that an adequate remedy is less than what 
Congress authorized in the patent laws-treble damages and attorneys' 
fees. "0 But, beyond that, the meaning of "adequacy" is uncertain. It is 
possible that an "adequate" remedy under the Due Process Clause is 
equivalent to "just compensation" under the Takings Clause,'1' consisting 
of compensatory but not punitive relief. The due process regime thus differs 
from the forum-allocation regime in that the remedy required by the Due 
Process Clause is not necessarily the same as the remedy Congress 
specified in the statute. It may be either narrower or broader.'12 
Among the other ambiguities that remain after Florida Prepaid is 
whether the "adequate" remedy required by the Due Process Clause is a 
remedy against the state itself or merely its officers. Some of the Court's 
procedural due process cases suggest that the Due Process Clause entitles 
persons deprived of property by the state to a remedy against the state itself. 
McKesson, for example, was a case brought by a taxpayer seeking a refund 
from the state on the ground that the state tax was unconstitutional. The 
108. See id. at 2209. 
109. See id. at 2209 & n.9. 
110. See id. at 2209. 
111. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
112. That it may be broader appears to follow from the Court's rejection of the "bitter with 
the sweet" interpretation of the Due Process Clause advocated by then-Justice Rehnquist's 
plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974), under which the Due Process 
Clause would protect only such procedures as the legislature provided for when it created the 
right. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1984) (rejecting Justice 
Rehnquist's "bitter with the sweet" theory); Vdzquez, supra note 14, at 1768-70 (discussing the 
Court's rejection of the "bitter with the sweet" theory); infra Part III. 
2000] Sovereign Immunity and Due Process 1947 
state courts agreed that the state tax violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause,113 but held that full compensatory relief was not required under 
Florida law.114 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, if the state denies 
taxpayers a predeprivation opportunity to challenge a tax's validity, then 
the Due Process Clause requires a postdeprivation hearing and, if the tax 
was invalid-and no other remedy would cure the violation-a refund."' 
This case and others" 6 suggest that the remedy required by the Due Process 
Clause is a remedy against the state. 
The Parratt v. Taylor line of procedural due process cases, however, 
suggests that the Due Process Clause is satisfied as long as the state makes 
available a damage remedy against responsible state officials. Parratt was a 
suit brought by a prisoner under ? 1983"' seeking damages for a state 
official's destruction of his hobby kit."8 The prisoner argued that the state 
officer was liable under ? 1983 because he had deprived the prisoner of his 
property without due process. The Court agreed that the hobby kit was 
property, but held that, if the deprivation was random and unauthorized, 
as it was in that case,119 the state satisfies its obligations under the Due 
Process Clause by making available a postdeprivation remedy.120 In Parratt, 
Nebraska had made available a postdeprivation remedy against the state 
itself,121 but subsequent cases indicate that a postdeprivation remedy against 
the officer suffices for due process purposes.122 
In an earlier article, I suggested that these two lines of due process 
cases could be reconciled, and other doctrinal conundrums solved, if 
McKesson were interpreted as holding that the remedy required by the Due 
Process Clause is a remedy against state officials rather than the state 
113. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 25- 
26 (1990). 
114. See id. at 26. 
1 15. See id. at 51-52. 
116. See, e.g., Newsweek v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 522 U.S. 442 (1998) (per curiam) (requiring Florida to provide meaningful backward-looking relief); Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 
106, 114 (1994) (requiring the same relief from Georgia). 
117. 42 U.S.C. ? 1983 (1994). 
118. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 530 (1981). 
119. The destruction of the hobby kit was alleged to have been negligent. The Court in 
Parratt held that such negligent conduct can be a "deprivation" for due process purposes. See id. 
at 534-35. This holding was later reversed in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986), but 
the Parratt precedent remains applicable to willful conduct that is "random and unauthorized." 
See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 138 (1990); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 534 (1984). 
120. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544. 
121. Seeid.atS30. 
122. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 520 n.1; see also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 115 (citing Court 
precedent that a "postdeprivation tort remedy" suffices for random and unauthorized 
deprivations); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 349 (1993) (suggesting that Parratt requires 
federal courts " to develop constitutional standards defining the scope of various officials' 
liabilities"); Vdzquez, supra note 14, at 1771-72 n.386. 
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itself.123 As long as a state makes available a remedy against officials, it is 
not required by the Due Process Clause to entertain suits against itself. But 
if it immunizes its officials from liability, or if it otherwise burdens the right 
of action against the official-for example, by structuring its tax-collection 
system in such a way as to leave it unclear which official is liable-then it 
must substitute a suit against the state itself. On this view, the Court in 
McKesson and like cases held that the remedy must come from the state 
itself because the state had "consented" to the remedy by establishing a 
procedure for obtaining a refund of taxes from the state. The Due Process 
Clause would be satisfied, however, by a regime affording meaningful 
relief against state officials. 
The decision in Florida Prepaid provides slight additional support for 
the officer-liability interpretation of McKesson. The Court in Florida 
Prepaid stressed that the Due Process Clause is implicated only if persons 
are intentionally deprived of their property. The Court did not elaborate on 
the state-of-mind requirement, but the intent standard is susceptible of 
being interpreted as establishing the same standard of liability under the 
Due Process Clause as the Court has elaborated for recovery under ? 1983 
against individual state officers who violate federal law. In Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald,124 the Court held that officials are subject to damage liability 
only when they violate "clearly established" federal law. Although the 
" clearly established" standard, especially as interpreted in such cases 
as Anderson v. Creighton,125 seems more stringent than the Due Process 
Clause's "intentional" or "nonnegligent" standard, this Term's cases 
suggest a convergence. In Alden, the Court described the " clearly 
established" standard as determining when a wrong is "fairly attributable" 
to the officer.126 This may not signal a weakening of the standard, but it 
does indicate that the Court perceives it as reflecting a minimum standard 
of fairness. On the other hand, the opinion in Florida Prepaid suggests 
a possible transmutation of the "nonnegligent" standard into a 
"recklessness" standard, which begins to resemble more closely the 
"clearly established" standard, as it has actually been applied.127 
This possible convergence offers some support for the claim that the 
remedy required by the Due Process Clause is a remedy against state 
officials, but the support is very weak. First, it is far from clear that the 
123. See Vdzquez, supra note 14, at 1770. 
124. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
125. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
126. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267 (1999). 
127. The Court in Florida Prepaid cited the fact that Congress did not " focus on instances of 
intentional or reckless infringement on the part of the States" as indicating that it was not focusing 
on violations of due process. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. 
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2209-10 (1999). On the other hand, it suggested elsewhere that 
"nonnegligent" infringement may be the standard. See id. at 2210. 
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Court has the same standard in mind for the two contexts.128 Moreover, the 
claim that the Due Process Clause requires a remedy only if the state or its 
officers have violated clearly established state law is in tension with the 
Court's holding in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation129 that the 
Court's constitutional interpretations must be applied retroactively to 
pending tax refund suits if the interpretation was applied to the parties in 
the case in which it was rendered.130 Although this holding may technically 
be compatible with a remedial rule under which damages would be 
unavailable to taxpayers if the constitutional interpretation that rendered the 
law invalid had not been clearly established at the time the tax was 
collected,"3' the latter rule would appear to render the retroactivity holding 
wholly irrelevant.132 The Court could reconcile Harper with a "clearly 
established" standard for other types of property cases by limiting 
the retroactivity holding to suits seeking restitution of taxes paid without a 
prior hearing,133 but neither Harper nor Florida Prepaid alludes to such a 
limitation. In view of the weakness and ambiguity of the support for the 
128. It should be noted, moreover, that this convergent standard, if such it is, would be only a 
default rule. The due process standard represents a mandatory federal floor. The officers' qualified 
immunity for violations of federal law that were not clearly established, on the other hand, has 
been treated by the Court as a subconstitutional ceiling. Unless the Court means to 
constitutionalize the officers' qualified immunity, cf Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 
n.15 (1996) (suggesting that this immunity may have constitutional underpinnings), Congress 
would have the power to dispense with it and render state officials liable for violations of not- 
clearly-established federal law. If so, then the convergent standard would apply unless Congress 
establishes a more lenient one. 
129. 509 U.S. 86 (1993). 
130. See id. at 97. The Court thus rejected the position of the plurality in American Trucking 
Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 183 (1990), under which constitutional interpretations were held 
not to be retroactively applicable if the state had reasonably relied on the prior construction. 
131. Cf James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991) (holding that a 
new constitutional interpretation applies retroactively, but expressly reserving questions of 
remedy). 
132. Compare Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995), in which the Court 
rejected a state's attempt to deny on state-law "remedial" grounds a remedy for a violation of a 
constitutional ruling that the Court had found to be retroactively applicable to the case at hand. 
Although the Court recognized that some state-law remedial imitations might be valid, it held that 
such limitations are invalid if they are based on the same considerations that underlie federal 
retroactivity doctrine. To hold otherwise, the Court said, would reduce the federal retroactivity 
rule to "symbolic significance." Id. at 753. Although this decision does not bear directly on the 
applicability of a federal remedial limitation of damage relief to cases involving a violation of 
clearly established federal law, its reasoning is in tension with the existence of such a limitation. 
Cf RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 853 (4th ed. 1996) (suggesting that Reynoldsville Casket "cast doubt on the 
permissibility of denying relief, as a matter of remedial discretion, for violation of a 'novel' 
constitutional rule"). On the other hand, the relief that the state court had denied in that case was 
essentially prospective relief; the Court's holding is thus consistent with the view that damage 
relief is available against the state for deprivations of property and liberty that violate a 
retroactively applicable principle of federal law only if the federal-law principle was clearly 
established. 
133. See Richard Fallon & Daniel Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1731, 1824-33 (1991). 
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officer-liability view in Florida Prepaid, the remainder of my analysis will 
assume that the Court did not reject the prevailing interpretation of 
McKesson, under which the adequate postdeprivation remedy required by 
the Due Process Clause is a remedy against the state itself. 
The practical difference between the officer-liability and government- 
liability regimes is in any event probably not great.134 As noted, an officer- 
liability regime would presumably be adequate only if it were reasonably 
clear which officers would be personally liable for infringements. In such 
circumstances, however, the relevant officers would tend to steer clear of 
depriving persons of property or liberty. Since excessive caution would 
likely redound to the detriment of the states, the states would find it 
necessary to offer to indemnify officers for any (or at least some) federal 
liabilities. States could pass statutes undertaking to reimburse officers under 
given circumstances, or they could agree to reimburse them in employment 
contracts. Alternatively, they could pay the officers' liability-insurance 
premiums. Regardless of which scheme is adopted, the property holder will 
be assured of substantial payment, and the financial burden will ultimately 
be borne by the state.135 In the end, de jure officer liability is likely to mean 
de facto state liability. If so, it may simply be easier for all concerned for 
the state to establish an adequate remedy against itself.136 
Whether Florida Prepaid resurrects the forum-allocation view for 
deprivations of liberty and property depends as well on the resolution of 
another ambiguity in the Court's decision. Under the forum-allocation 
view, the states are required to entertain in their own courts suits against 
themselves seeking remedies required by federal law, and, if they fail to 
134. See John Jeffries, In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 47, 60-68 (1998); VAzquez, supra note 14, at 1790-804. This would certainly be the case if 
the same standard of liability and state-of-mind requirement applied under the Due Process Clause 
in suits against the state as in suits against the officer. If the officer were entitled to an immunity 
for violations of not-clearly-established law, but the state were liable for all nonnegligent 
violations, the regimes would differ to a greater extent. Even if the point of giving the officer a 
broader immunity were to reduce the risk of overdeterrence attributable to (1) the added 
embarrassment the officer might suffer at being personally named a defendant and (2) the (slight) 
risk that the officer might actually have to pay the victim some money from his own pocket, the 
officer's immunity would narrow the range of cases for which a remedy would be available. For a 
comparison of the officer-liability and government-liability regimes in the light of official 
immunity and indemnification, see Vdzquez, supra note 3. 
135. For an elaboration of the propositions in this paragraph, see V~zquez, supra note 14, at 
1801-04. If the state does not find it necessary to make adjustments in its compensation package 
to officers, that will be because the market for such jobs has already fully accounted for the 
officers' potential iability for deprivations of property or liberty. 
136. If the remedy required by Due Process were a remedy against the official, then, strictly 
speaking, Florida Prepaid would not resurrect he forum-allocation view, as that view related to 
suits against the state itself. Suits against officers did not fall within the states' immunity under 
either the forum-allocation view orthe immunity-from-liability view. Of course, if the Court were 
to extend sovereign immunity to suits against state officers, then Alden would mean that officers 
would not be liable, but Florida Prepaid, if read to embrace the officer-liability interpretation of 
McKesson, would partially resurrect he forum-allocation view. 
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provide such remedies, the Supreme Court may reverse their judgments on 
appeal. The Court in Alden held that sovereign immunity protects the states 
from suits in their own courts seeking monetary relief. Florida Prepaid 
would resurrect for property and liberty interests the scheme rejected in 
Alden only if the Court were envisioning that the states would be required 
to provide a remedy in their own courts for intentional deprivations of 
property or liberty, notwithstanding any claim of sovereign immunity, and 
that the Supreme Court could reverse state-court judgments that fail to 
provide the remedy on sovereign immunity grounds. Is that the regime that 
the Court was contemplating? 
It appears to be. To insist on sovereign immunity is to deny a remedy; if 
the Due Process Clause requires the remedy, it precludes a defense of 
sovereign immunity."' Perhaps a state would be permitted to insist on 
sovereign immunity if it substituted an adequate remedy against the officer, 
but, as noted, it is likely that states that permit suits against officers would 
find themselves footing the bill anyway. At any rate, to insist on sovereign 
immunity without affording an adequate alternative remedy would appear 
to be a violation of the obligation under the Due Process Clause to provide 
an adequate remedy. If the state denies a remedy on sovereign immunity 
grounds, or provides an inadequate remedy, presumably the Supreme Court 
may review the case and reverse on the ground that the state courts 
committed legal error in giving effect to the claim of sovereign immunity."38 
That the Court contemplated this result is suggested by its treatment of 
Reich in Alden. Reich was among the cases to hold that the Due Process 
Clause in certain circumstances requires a damage remedy against the state. 
As discussed above, the Court in Alden distinguished the case as one in 
which the remedy was required by the Constitution-in that case the Due 
Process Clause itself. The language in Reich that the Court distinguished 
affirmed that if the Due Process Clause requires a remedy, then the states 
must provide it, "the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their 
own courts notwithstanding." 139 
An alternative view would be that the Due Process Clause requires the 
state to provide the remedy, but that a state's invocation of sovereign 
immunity will be respected by the Supreme Court on direct review. On this 
137. See Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106,109-10 (1994). 
138. The Court this Term unanimously reaffirmed the holding of McKesson and other cases 
that the Eleventh Amendment does not limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. See South 
Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 119 S. Ct. 1180, 1184 (1999). 
139. Reich, 513 U.S. at 110; see also Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2259 (1999). The 
Court in Alden described Reich as a case in which the Due Process Clause required a remedy 
against the state because the state had "promised" one. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2259. This may 
provide additional support for the officer-liability interpretation of McKesson: The Due Process 
Clause does not always require a remedy against the state itself, but if the state immunizes its 
officers and substitutes a remedy against the state, then the Due Process Clause requires an 
adequate remedy against the state. 
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view, the state's denial of the remedy required by the Due Process Clause 
would simply trigger Congress's power to enforce the clause by making the 
states suable in federal court. This regime would certainly be odd, for it 
would require the simultaneous acceptance of seemingly contradictory 
positions: (1) States are obliged by the Due Process Clause to provide an 
adequate remedy, but (2) states may deny any remedy by invoking 
sovereign immunity. But this result does find some oblique support in 
Supreme Court opinions. In Seminole Tribe, for example, the Court 
indicated that the Supreme Court would have appellate jurisdiction over 
suits against states in the state courts only if the states had consented to 
suit.140 A state that invokes sovereign immunity is not consenting to suit. 
And in Coeur d'Alene, Justice Kennedy elaborated a conception of Ex parte 
Young as serving a sort of backstop function, permitting the federal courts 
to step in when the states refuse to provide the forms of relief necessary to 
vindicate federal law.141 As I have written elsewhere, this is in tension with 
the idea, supported by General Oil Co. v. Crain,142 that the state courts are 
required by the Constitution to provide such remedies themselves, and that 
the Supreme Court can reverse their judgments if they do not.143 Finally, the 
Court appears to have embraced the seemingly contradictory positions 
described above with respect to the sovereign immunity of the United 
States in takings cases. Although the Court has said that "in the event of a 
taking, the compensation remedy is required by the Constitution," 1 it has 
140. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996). 
141. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 271 (1997) (plurality opinion) 
("Where there is no available state forum the Young rule has special significance. In that instance 
providing a federal forum for a justiciable controversy is a specific application of the principle 
that the plan of the convention contemplates a regime in which federal guarantees are enforceable 
so long as there is a justiciable controversy."); Vdzquez, supra note 11, at 49-50 (examining 
Justice Kennedy's apparent conception of Ex parte Young as a backstop, permitting the federal 
courts to enforce federal rights that state courts decline to enforce). 
142. 209 U.S. 211 (1908). 
143. See Vdzquez, supra note 11, at 50 n.319 (discussing Justice Kennedy's treatment of 
Crain in Coeur d'Alene). This alternative regime would also help explain an otherwise puzzling 
feature of the Parratt line of cases. As noted, the Court has held in those cases that persons who 
are deprived of their liberty or property in a random and unauthorized way may obtain a damages 
remedy in federal court under ? 1983 if positive state law does not offer an adequate 
postdeprivation remedy. If the Due Process Clause requires the states to provide a remedy, 
however, and if that requirement were enforceable by the Supreme Court even in the face of a 
claim of sovereign immunity, then it is unclear why the absence of a positive state-law source for 
the state-court remedy should matter. See Vdzquez, supra note 14, at 1757 n.331. By contrast, the 
availability of a damages remedy in federal court under ? 1983 would be explicable under a 
regime in which sovereign immunity bars Supreme Court review of suits against unconsenting 
states, even if the remedy is required by the Due Process Clause. Under such a regime, the state's 
failure to provide a remedy required by the Due Process Clause merely triggers a federal power to 
provide the remedy. 
144. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 
(1987); see also Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the Misappropriation of 
Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments Before and After Seminole Tribe: The 
Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 55 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 849, 871-73 
(1998) (describing states' remedial obligations under the Takings Clause). 
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also taken the position that a suit for compensation may not be maintained 
against the United States in the absence of a waiver of sovereign 
immunity."45 
On the other hand, Alden's treatment of Reich suggests that the 
Seminole Tribe dictum about consent is subject to an exception where the 
Constitution itself requires the remedy. Justice Kennedy's "backstop" 
interpretation of Ex parte Young garnered only the vote of the Chief 
Justice.146 More importantly, Kennedy's majority opinion in Alden appears 
to reject the conception of Ex parte Young that he espoused in Coeur 
d'Alene. The Alden Court described Crain as a case in which the rule of Ex 
parte Young was "extend[ed]" to "state-court suits."'147 If the majority 
viewed Ex parte Young as providing a federal-court backstop for cases in 
which the state courts failed to provide a remedy, it is unclear how that rule 
could have been "extended" to state-court suits. The majority now appears 
to accept Crain as establishing a right to an injunctive remedy against state 
officials in state courts, enforceable by the Supreme Court on appeal, 
paralleling the right to a remedy in federal court recognized in Ex parte 
Young. 
Perhaps the Young-Crain principle is irrelevant anyway because the 
remedy it recognized was one against the official rather than the state itself, 
and state sovereign immunity does not extend to officers. But Crain and 
Young both involved prospective relief, and in that context the distinction 
between suits against the state and suits against the officer is almost purely 
formal. Alden, moreover, says that Ex parte Young is based on "the premise 
that sovereign immunity bars relief against States and their officers in both 
state and federal courts." 148 It then asserts that Crain and Young establish 
that "certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief" may be brought in 
state and federal courts, notwithstanding this immunity, " if the Constitution 
is to remain the supreme law of the land." 149 The Court thus seems to be 
saying that while state sovereign immunity does extend to officials, it is 
overridden in certain cases based on federal law by the remedial demands 
of the Supremacy Clause.150 Similarly, one could say that the states are not 
145. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 580-82 (1934); Schillinger v. United 
States, 155 U.S. 163, 168 (1894); see also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 613 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) ("No one would suggest that, if Congress had not passed the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 
? 1491(a)(1), the courts would be able to order disbursements from the Treasury to pay for 
property taken under lawful authority (and subsequently destroyed) without just compensation."). 
See generally Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in 
Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REv. 57, 137-39 (1999) 
(discussing sovereign immunity constraints on recovery for government akings). 
146. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 261, 263-64, 270-71. 
147. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2263 (1999). 
148. Id. (emphasis added). 
149. Id. 
150. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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entitled to insist on the sovereign immunity that they would otherwise enjoy 
from private damage actions if the Due Process Clause requires the remedy. 
If the state court fails to provide the required remedy, the U.S. Supreme 
Court may reverse its judgment. 
The Court's treatment of the sovereign immunity of the United States in 
takings cases offers some support for the opposite view. If a constitutionally 
required damage remedy against the federal government may not be sought 
in court without the federal government's consent, then perhaps the 
constitutional scheme does not require the availability of private suits to 
recover similar constitutionally required remedies against the states without 
their consent.151 There may be ways to reconcile the federal sovereign 
immunity cases with the position that states may not rely on their sovereign 
immunity to deny a remedy required by the Constitution, 152 but this issue 
need not detain us further. If indeed the United States is immune from suits 
seeking compensation for unlawful takings of property unless it consents, 
then the immunity of the states is indisputably different in at least one 
important respect: As the Court held in Florida Prepaid, the states may be 
subjected to such suits without their consent if the federal government 
authorizes them pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
By exercising its abrogation power, Congress can effectively require 
the states to provide the constitutionally required remedy in their own 
courts on pain of federal reversal of their judgments. Contrary to the claims 
of some commentators,153 Florida Prepaid does not necessarily hold that 
abrogation of sovereign immunity is permissible only if the states have 
engaged in a pattern of prior violations of the Constitution. The opinion 
suggests strongly that a statute abrogating state sovereign immunity would 
be valid, even in the absence of a finding of prior violations of the 
Constitution, if it included the sovereign immunity equivalent of a 
"jurisdictional hook." In striking down the abrogation in the patent laws, 
the Court noted that " Congress did nothing to limit the coverage of the Act 
to cases involving arguable constitutional violations, such as where a State 
151. Cf Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 34 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (" I think it impossible to find in the scheme of the Constitution a necessity 
that private remedies [against the states] be expanded ... to include a remedy not available, for a 
similar infraction, against the United States."). 
152. For example, the Court could resolve the apparent contradiction between First English 
and the sovereign immunity cases by limiting the former's statement hat the Constitution requires 
the compensation remedy to takings by entities not entitled to sovereign immunity. See Brauneis, 
supra note 145, at 138 & n.344. In other cases, the constitutionally required remedy for an 
uncompensated taking by the state and federal governments might be the nullity of the taking, 
combined with a damage remedy against responsible officers. See id. This would be tantamount to 
an embrace of the officer-liability regime discussed above and in Vdzquez, supra note 14. 
153. See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival 
Portend the Future-or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 110, 138 (1999) 
(interpreting Florida Prepaid as permitting abrogation only if it is " narrowly tailored to 
prevention or remedy of a demonstrable pattern of constitutional violations"). 
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refuses to offer any state-court remedy for patent owners whose patents it 
had infringed." 154 This suggests that Congress could authorize a federal- 
court suit against any state that violates the Constitution and fails to afford 
the constitutionally required remedy.155 If Congress can subject a state to an 
original suit in the lower federal courts in such circumstances, then it can 
surely take the lesser step of authorizing appeals to the Supreme Court, or 
presumably to lower federal courts,156 from state-court actions seeking the 
constitutionally required remedy.'57 Indeed, the Florida Prepaid opinion 
suggests that Congress may authorize suits against the states directly in 
federal court if the states do not have a statute on the books authorizing 
such suits in state courts.158 If Congress passes a statute making it clear that 
states shall be suable directly in federal court unless they have such a 
statute on the books, then states are very likely to enact such statutes. If 
Congress provides further that the judgments of such courts shall be 
reviewable by the Supreme Court or by inferior federal courts, then it will 
have substantially replicated the forum-allocation regime. 
Even if the Due Process Clause requires states to provide a remedy 
against themselves in their own courts when they willfully deprive 
154. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 
2199, 2210 (1999). 
155. In striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act in United States v. Lopez, the Court 
said similarly that the Act "has no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a 
discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on 
interstate commerce." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995). Congress soon amended 
the statute to add the missing jurisdictional element. See 18 U.S.C.A. ? 922(q)(2)(a) (West Supp. 
1998) ("It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in 
or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or 
has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."). The amended statute has been upheld without 
much controversy. See, e.g., United States v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir. 1995) (per 
curiam). 
156. See James E. Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: Federal 
Appellate Court Review of State-Court Judgments After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. REv. 161, 
213-28 (1998). 
157. A statute authorizing such appeals would be valid, regardless of whether one considered 
Supreme Court review of a state-court dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds to be an exercise 
of original or appellate jurisdiction. Although Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 
(1803), held that the Supreme Court lacks original jurisdiction over suits arising under federal 
law, a suit against a state properly authorized by Congress pursuant o Section 5 would appear to 
be within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction as a suit "in which a State shall be a Party" 
within the meaning of Article III, Section 2. 
158. See supra text accompanying note 154. On the other hand, the Court elsewhere said that 
it was " worth mentioning" that Florida statutes authorize " a legislative remedy through a claims 
bill for payment in full" as well as a judicial remedy. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2209 n.9. 
If the Court here meant to suggest that a damages remedy received through the grace of the 
legislature would satisfy the remedial requirements of the Due Process Clause, then the statute 
abrogating sovereign immunity might have to afford the states a reasonable amount of time to 
consider whether to grant a legislative remedy. Still, Congress would presumably be able to 
provide a federal forum against states that do not in fact provide an adequate remedy-whether 
legislatively or judicially-within a reasonable time. Clearly, the mere existence of a mechanism 
under which a property holder may request a legislative remedy does not satisfy the remedial 
demands of the Due Process Clause if the legislature fails to provide a remedy. 
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individuals of liberty or property, and even if their failure to do so is 
reviewable by the Supreme Court, the due process regime may differ from 
the forum-allocation regime in some details. The Supreme Court would 
have the power to reverse any state court judgment that denied a remedy on 
sovereign immunity grounds, or that applied a remedial standard that was 
inadequate as a matter of law. But otherwise, appellate review in the federal 
courts may be limited. It is possible that errors of fact would be reviewable 
only under the " some evidence" standard.159 As a practical matter, 
however, this would not represent a dramatic departure from the forum- 
allocation model, as the Supreme Court rarely reviews a case just to correct 
a factual error. 
Of greater concern is the possibility that errors of law would not be 
reviewable de novo. Perhaps the Court would say that it is empowered to 
reverse only if the state proceeding violated due process, and that a state 
proceeding in which a disinterested judge received evidence following fair 
procedures and conscientiously found the facts and applied the law satisfies 
due process even if the judge committed legal error. If so, then the " clearly 
established" standard the Court uses in the officer-liability context may 
find its way into the due process regime through the back door.160 Whether 
an error of law constitutes a violation of due process is a question that 
rarely arises,16 but the recent decisions cutting back on the availability of 
habeas relief may suggest a negative answer.162 Subjecting Supreme Court 
review to some variant of the Harlow standard would constitute a marked 
difference between the due process regime and the forum-allocation regime. 
But the Court, I think, is more likely to hold that de novo review of 
questions of federal law is available in the Supreme Court.163 If so, then, 
159. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 447 (1985); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 
362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960); see also Gerald Neuman, The Constitutional Requirement of "Some 
Evidence, " 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 631 (1988). 
160. Presumably, the judge's application of the law would not count as conscientious if it 
conflicted with clear federal precedent. 
161. To be sure, " [t]he Court in Crowell [v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932),] appeared to assume 
that Article III, the Due Process Clause, or both required independent judicial decision of 
questions of law in private rights cases." FALLON ET AL., supra note 132, at 397. But I am 
assuming that the state courts have provided an "independent judicial decision." The question is 
whether the Due Process Clause requires de novo review of such a decision. The Court in Crowell 
was discussing whether judicial review of the decisions of federal administrative agencies was 
required, and it read the relevant statutes to guarantee de novo review of questions of law. 
162. For example, though the federal habeas statute for state prisoners authorized relief for 
those "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," 28 
U.S.C. ? 2254 (1994), the Court held in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), that a state 
conviction could not be challenged on habeas on the basis of legal errors regarding the exclusion 
of evidence under the Fourth Amendment so long as the state court had offered a "full and fair 
hearing" on the question. This may suggest that depriving someone of his liberty who has 
received such a hearing does not violate the Due Process Clause even if legal error was 
committed. 
163. The Court has so far seen fit to apply heightened standards only to the lower federal 
courts. It seems uninterested in limiting the scope of its own powers. See, e.g., Wilson v. 
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subject to the reservations and qualifications stated earlier in this Part, the 
due process regime for enforcement of federally created property rights 
against the states would appear to be a substantial resurrection of the forum- 
allocation regime for the enforcement of federal statutory rights against the 
states. 
III. COLLEGE SAVINGS BANK AND THE NARROWING OF DUE PROCESS 
Though the regime the Court appears to have in mind for property and 
liberty rights may differ in some details from the forum-allocation regime, 
it sufficiently resembles it that the Court's decision in Florida Prepaid may 
fairly be regarded as a partial resurrection of that regime. The resurrection 
is partial, most importantly because it applies only to state violations of 
federal obligations that give rise to property or liberty interests within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause. In this Part, I consider the meaning of 
the concept of "property" after the Court's decision this Term in College 
Savings Bank. I consider specifically whether the right claimed by the 
plaintiffs in Alden constitutes a property right under the Court's prevailing 
doctrine. If it does, then the Court in Florida Prepaid either resurrected the 
forum-allocation view with respect to the very sort of right involved in the 
case in which the Court purported to reject the same view, or repudiated the 
understanding of " property" that had prevailed until then. 
A. Background 
The Court's attempts to give a precise definition to the terms " liberty" 
and " property" for purposes of procedural due process are of 
comparatively recent vintage.l16 Writing in 1980, John Hart Ely observed 
that 
[u]ntil recently, the general outlines of the law of procedural due 
process were pretty clear and uncontroversial. The phrase "life, 
liberty or property" was read as a unit and given an open-ended, 
functional interpretation, which meant that the government couldn't 
seriously hurt you without due process of law. What process was 
"due" varied, naturally enough, with context, in particular with 
how seriously you were being hurt and what procedures would be 
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (demonstrating that the relief unavailable in the lower federal 
courts under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); and Powell, 428 U.S. 465, is available in the 
Supreme Court on direct appeal); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987); see also South Cent. 
Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 119 S. Ct. 1180, 1184 (1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment 
does not limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction). 
164. Attempts to define " liberty" for purposes of substantive due process, on the other hand, 
have been longstanding and controversial. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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useful and feasible under the circumstances. But if you were 
seriously hurt by the state you were entitled to due process.165 
According to Henry Monaghan, the Court in this period read the Due 
Process Clause to protect "all interests valued by sensible men." 166 The 
right-privilege distinction limited the scope of substantive due process, and 
may for a time have limited procedural due process as well,'67 but the 
distinction was largely abandoned before the Court decided Goldberg v. 
Kelly,168 the case most closely identified with the concept of "new 
property." Goldberg itself was not a significant departure from the 
approach described by Ely and Monaghan.169 Indeed, all sides conceded that 
the government's withdrawal of welfare benefits had to comply with due 
process.'70 The Court's confirmation that such benefits were property came 
in a footnote and stressed the importance of such benefits to their 
recipients.'7' Goldberg has been described as a "lodestar," 172 and has been 
blamed (or credited) for the " due process explosion" that followed it.'73 Its 
controversial feature, however, was not its conclusion that welfare was 
property, but rather its decision about the sort of process that was due in 
welfare cases. As Judge Henry Friendly observed, "After the usual litany 
that the required hearing 'need not take the form of a judicial or quasi- 
judicial trial,' Mr. Justice Brennan proceeded to demand almost all the 
elements of one." 174 
The Burger Court subsequently adopted a more flexible balancing test 
for determining what process is due,'75 but at the same time, it obviated that 
165. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 19 (1980); see also Timothy P. Terrell, 
"Property," "Due Process," and the Distinction Between Definition and Theory in Legal 
Analysis, 70 GEO. L.J. 861, 881 (1982) (" [I]nstead of focusing on the basis for a due process 
inquiry-the deprivation of some element of the trigger mechanism [i.e., 'life, liberty, or 
property']-the Supreme Court largely ignored that issue and preoccupied itself almost entirely 
with the narrow procedural fairness of the administrative process involved."). 
166. Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 409 
(1977); see also id. at 423 (citing Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916), for the proposition that the 
concept of " liberty" embraces " all the interests in personal security ... which had been protected 
from private interference by the common-law courts"). But cf. Stephen F. Williams, Liberty and 
Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 20 n.68 (1983) (disputing 
Monaghan). 
167. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in 
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Williams, supra note 166, at 20-21 & n.68. 
168. 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970). See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 167. 
169. But cf. Williams, supra note 166, at 14-15, 20-21 n.68 (arguing that Goldberg's reliance 
on the importance of the interest was an innovation). 
170. See id. at 14. 
171. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8 (citing Charles Reich, Individual Rights and Social 
Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Charles Reich, The New 
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)). 
172. Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1299 (1975). 
173. Id. at 1268. 
174. Id. at 1299. 
175. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). 
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issue in many cases by adopting narrower definitions of the concepts that 
trigger the obligation to afford due process-liberty and property. Having 
previously found that the deprivation of a government job triggers the Due 
Process Clause,'76 the Court in Board of Regents v. Roth held that a 
government job is a property right only if the employee has a legitimate 
expectation of continued employment.177 The employee's expectation of 
employment is legitimate if the state's power to terminate the employment 
is limited by statute or contract.178 But someone who holds a job terminable 
after a year lacks a property interest in the job after the expiration of 
the year, as he has no "legitimate" expectation to continue to hold the 
job.'79 The " entitlement," or " legitimate expectation," standard has largely 
displaced the test focusing on the importance of the right.'80 Under this test, 
a person possesses a property right whenever the law places mandatory 
obligations on the state for his benefit.'8' 
The Court's emphasis on the legitimate expectation resting on statutes 
or other positive law was taken a step further by then-Justice Rehnquist's 
plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy'82 and by the Court in Bishop v. 
Wood.'83 The latter suggested what the former had expressly adopted, the 
"bitter with the sweet" theory, under which a putative property right 
created by statute includes as part of its definition the procedures the statute 
establishes for its termination.'84 Under this theory, if state law provides 
that employees may be terminated only for good cause, but the statute goes 
on to state that the job may be terminated without notice or a hearing, the 
latter limitations are regarded as a part of the definition of the employee's 
property right. In Justice Rehnquist's words, the employee "must take the 
bitter with the sweet." 185 According to this view, for any property right 
created by statute, the procedures set forth in the statute would always 
satisfy due process. Professor Van Alstyne regarded this approach as a 
major "crack in the new property," 186 even though only a minority of the 
Court had subscribed to it in Arnett. The Court repaired this crack in 
176. See Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971); Slochower v. Board of Higher 
Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952). 
177. 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972). 
178. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985); Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). 
179. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 578. 
180. See Williams, supra note 166, at 4-5. 
181. See Timothy P. Terrell, Causes of Action as Property: Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. 
and the "Government-as-Monopolist" Theory of the Due Process Clause, 31 EMORY L.J. 491, 
499 (1982). 
182. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). 
183. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). 
184. See id. at 153-54 (plurality opinion). 
185. Id. at 153. 
186. See William Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in 
the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL . REv. 445 (1977). 
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Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, in which a majority expressly 
disavowed the "bitter with the sweet" theory,187 over Justice Rehnquist's 
dissent.188 The Court held that the Due Process Clause required a distinction 
between substantive and procedural limitations; only substantive limitations 
included in the statute creating the right are relevant to whether a property 
right exists; if one does exist, procedural limitations must satisfy the Due 
Process Clause.189 
Until Seminole Tribe, there appeared to be little reason to deny that the 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law applied to all persons 
seeking to enforce mandatory legal obligations of the states. In Seminole 
Tribe, however, the Court held that Congress has the power to abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but not pursuant to Article I. Under the prevailing definition of property, 
Congress would potentially have an easy way to circumvent the latter 
holding: If any mandatory legal obligation imposed by Congress under 
Article I for the benefit of private individuals were deemed to give rise to a 
correlative property (or liberty) right under the Due Process Clause, 
Congress would arguably be able to abrogate sovereign immunity under 
Section 5 to "enforce" any such obligations. Acceptance of such a power 
would have effectively gutted Seminole Tribe's holding.'90 The Court 
avoided this problem in Florida Prepaid by holding that, even if there is a 
property right, Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity 
from federal-court jurisdiction only if the states fail to afford a remedy for 
the deprivation in their own courts.'9' But the Court's affirmation that the 
Due Process Clause requires the states to provide a remedy in their own 
courts, when combined with the "legitimate expectation" test for defining 
property, threatens to gut the Court's holding in Alden that states are 
entitled to sovereign immunity in their own courts. This problem would, 
indeed, have existed even under the narrower test espoused by Justice 
Rehnquist in Arnett, but later disavowed in Loudermill. The Court in 
College Savings Bank avoided a total gutting of Alden by embracing an 
even narrower definition of property. The cost of this partial preservation of 
187. 470 U.S. 532, 540 (1985) (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)). 
188. See id. at 561 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
189. See id. at 541. 
190. I have called this problem the " abrogation reductio." Vdzquez, supra note 14, at 1744. 
191. As discussed above, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion also makes it clear that, in the 
case of a statutorily created property right, the Due Process Clause does not necessarily require all 
the procedures that the statute gives the property holder. See supra text accompanying notes 182- 
184. Thus, either he has abandoned the "bitter with the sweet" theory or the theory incorporates 
procedures into the definition of the property right only when the statute establishes procedures 
that would otherwise fall short of due process. 
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Alden, however, was a corresponding constriction of the basic protections 
of the Due Process Clause.192 
The Court's previous efforts to respond to the "due process explosion" 
by limiting the definition of "liberty" and "property" have not been well 
received. According to Professor Ely, 
What has ensued has been a disaster, in both practical and 
theoretical terms. Not only has the number of occasions on which 
one is entitled to any procedural protection at all been steadily 
constricted, but the Court has made itself look quite silly in the 
process-drawing distinctions it is flattering to call attenuated, and 
engaging in ill-disguised premature judgments on the merits of the 
case before it .... The line of decisions has been subjected to 
widespread scholarly condemnation, which suggests that sometime 
within the next thirty years we may be rid of it.'93 
Since those words were written in 1980, the doctrine in this area has taken a 
significant step in what Professor Ely would presumably consider the right 
direction with the rejection of the "bitter with the sweet" theory. College 
Savings Bank, however, suggests that the doctrine will get worse before it 
gets better. As discussed below, the decision appears to rest on distinctions 
even sillier than those Ely criticized. Moreover, even the decisions that 
Ely criticized recognized that "liberty" and " property" are " greatt 
concepts ... purposely left to gather meaning from experience.... [Whey 
relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen 
who founded this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society remains 
unchanged."194 This functionalist approach to defining "property"' 
192. There would have been no need to mold a definition of property to accommodate 
sovereign immunity doctrine if the Court had decided either (1) that the states may not rely on 
sovereign immunity in their own courts to refuse to provide a remedy to which Congress has 
subjected them in conformity with the Tenth Amendment, or (2) that, if a remedy is barred by 
sovereign immunity, then it is not required by the Due Process Clause, even if the state has 
deprived someone of a property or liberty interest. But the Court rejected the first option in Alden, 
see supra Part I, and it rejected the second in Florida Prepaid, see supra Part II. 
193. ELY, supra note 165, at 19; see also Monaghan, supra note 166 (criticizing the Court's 
narrowing of liberty and property protected by the Due Process clause); Terrell, supra note 165 
(criticizing the Court's method of determining property for due process purposes); Van Alstyne, 
supra note 186 (criticizing restrictions on new property); Williams, supra note 166 (criticizing the 
Court's entire new property jurisprudence). 
194. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (quoting National Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
195. Professor Merrill calls this approach to defining property nominalismm." This school of 
thought "views property as a purely conventional concept with no fixed meaning-an empty 
vessel that can be filled by each legal system in accordance with its peculiar values and beliefs." 
Thomas Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 737 (1998). Although 
Professor Merrill is not an adherent of this school, he acknowledges that " todaya, the nominalist 
conception is more-or-less the orthodox understanding of property within the American legal 
community. Law students have been instructed for years that the bundle of rights metaphor 
accurately captures the nature of the institution of property." Id. at 738. 
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contrasts with the Court's more limited approach in the takings area, in 
which it has restricted the concept of property to its more traditional 
common-law meaning, which takes into account such factors as the 
alienability of the putative property right.'96 
As discussed below, College Savings Bank appears to reject a 
functionalist approach in favor of a search for the essence of the concept of 
property. Just how far the Court has retreated remains uncertain, however. 
Because the cursory treatment of the issue in College Savings Bank appears 
to be internally inconsistent, the precise holding that the plaintiff lacked a 
property right could well be interpreted narrowly in the future or dismissed 
as a sport. Alternatively, the decision might in retrospect be regarded as an 
early step in a drastic contraction of the guarantee of procedural due 
process. 
B. College Savings Bank 
The right at issue in College Savings Bank was the right to be free from 
pecuniary injury resulting from a competitor's false advertising of its own 
product. Congress prohibited such false advertising in the Lanham Act and 
gave injured competitors a right to damages from the false advertiser.'97 
Congress made it clear that the prohibition applied to the states, and it 
expressly abrogated the states' immunity from suit in federal court.'98 At 
issue in the case was the validity of this abrogation. As in Florida Prepaid, 
the plaintiff argued that Congress's abrogation of the states' immunity was 
"appropriate legislation" under Section 5 because it sought to "enforce" 
the states' obligations under the Due Process Clause. The Court could 
easily have struck down the abrogation on the same ground as in Florida 
Prepaid, as there appears to have been no greater evidence of unremedied 
false advertising by states than there was of unremedied state patent 
infringements. By deciding instead that the interests invoked by the plaintiff 
were not property interests,'99 the Court established that, unlike states that 
infringe patents, states that engage in false advertising do not have to 
provide retrospective relief to those they injure. 
Under the "legitimate expectation" test, the right to be free from 
injuries caused by the state's false advertising of its own product should 
have qualified as a property right. Certainly, the plaintiff had an expectation 
that it would not suffer such an injury. Congress had specifically prohibited 
196. See Vdzquez, supra note 14, at 1752 & n.310. 
197. See 15 U.S.C. ? 1125 (1994). 
198. See 15 U.S.C.A. ?? 1122(a), 1125(a)(2) (West Supp. 1999). 
199. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 
2219, 2224-25 (1999). 
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false advertising, and the validity of this obligation was not in question.200 
The expectation would appear to have been " legitimate" in the sense that it 
was backed by a law placing mandatory obligations on the state. 
The Court nevertheless found that the right was not property for due 
process purposes. It stressed that "the hallmark of a protected property 
interest is the right to exclude others," 201 and it concluded that the right to 
be free from false advertising lacks this element. For the " right to exclude" 
requirement, though, the Court cited a takings case.202 The requirement 
appears to be new to due process jurisprudence, where the Court has said 
instead that "[t]he hallmark of property ... is an individual entitlement 
grounded in . .. law, which cannot be removed except 'for cause."'203 As 
discussed below, the "right to exclude" requirement seems difficult to 
square with such "new property" rights as the right to receive welfare 
benefits due in the future or the right to continue to hold a government job. 
This may suggest a retreat from that line of cases. But the "right to 
exclude" requirement is also difficult to square with some "old" property 
rights, including rights that seem indistinguishable from the right invoked 
by the plaintiff in this very case. 
The primary meaning of "exclude" is to bar someone or something 
from a place.2' This sense of the "right to exclude" is easy to apply to 
rights in real property, but not to other sorts of rights that are clearly 
" property." For example, the Court in College Savings Bank acknowledged 
that the Lanham Act's trademark provisions "may well" protect property 
interests.205 In what way do the trademark laws establish a " right to 
exclude"? A secondary meaning of " exclude" is " to prohibit someone from 
200. The obligation imposed on the states would appear to be valid under the standard the 
Court articulated in New York and Printz-that is, it is an obligation imposed on states as part of a 
broader class that includes private parties. See supra note 49. 
201. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224. 
202. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
203. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) (citations omitted). 
Professor Merrill argues that the right to exclude is "the sine qua non" of property, see Merrill, 
supra note 195, but all of the cases he cites in support of his argument are takings cases. He 
concedes that it is " a bit of a stretch" to claim that the due process cases are consistent with his 
view. Id. at 752; see also Leonard Kreynin, Breach of Contract as a Due Process Violation: Can 
the Constitution Be a Font of Contract Law?, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1098, 1106 (1990) (noting the 
different definitions of property for the purposes of the Due Process and Takings Clauses); 
Vdzquez, supra note 14, at 1752 n.310 (same); cf. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 527 
(1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Nor does application of the Due Process Clause automatically 
trigger the Takings Clause, just because the word 'property' appears in both. That word appears in 
the midst of different phrases with somewhat different objectives, thereby permitting differences 
in the way in which the term is interpreted."). 
204. See NEw SHORTER OXFORD DICTIONARY 875 definition 1 (5th ed. 1993). 
205. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224. The Court also conceded that unfair competition 
amounting to "theft of proprietary information" is the deprivation of a property right. Id. at 2225. 
This rests on the tautology that "proprietary information" is property. But it is worth noting that 
what makes such information proprietary-and thus property-is the fact that the law gives the 
" owner" of it the right to prohibit others from engaging in certain types of conduct. 
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an activity." 206 It is apparently this meaning that the Court had in mind. In 
acknowledging that some provisions of the Lanham Act may well establish 
property rights, the Court said that " trademarks ... are the 'property' of the 
owner because he can exclude others from using them."207 But the term 
"exclude," in this sense, is a synonym for "prohibit."'208 It is unclear why 
the false-advertising provisions of the Lanham Act do not satisfy this test. 
Under the Act, the plaintiff clearly had a right to " prohibit" activity on the 
part of the defendant. The Act itself prohibits false advertising, but the 
plaintiff had the right to prohibit the defendant's false advertising if such 
advertising caused the plaintiff injury.209 Clearly, this injury sufficed to give 
the plaintiff standing to obtain injunctive relief to stop any such false 
advertising, and the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude such relief in a 
suit against state officials.210 Thus, the false-advertising provisions of the 
Lanham Act cannot be distinguished from the trademark provisions on the 
ground that the latter include a "right to prohibit" whereas the former do 
not.211 
Nor can the rights reflected in the Lanham Act's false-advertising 
provisions be distinguished on this ground from other intellectual property 
rights that the Court has found to be "property." The Court in Florida 
Prepaid recognized that a state deprives a patentholder of property when it 
intentionally infringes the patent. But a state that infringes does not deprive 
206. NEW SHORTER OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 204, at 875 definition 2. 
207. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224. 
208. Similarly, Professor Merrill, who defends the centrality of the right to exclude to the 
concept of property, argues that someone who owns a copyright in a song has a right to exclude 
because he "can exclude others from performing or copying [the song]." Merrill, supra note 195, 
at 741 n.38. Again, a more apt word would have been "prohibit." 
209. Surely the Court does not mean that the plaintiff lacks a right to prohibit false 
advertising, because the statute itself prohibits such conduct. It is true that the heading of the 
pertinent section reads, "False designations of origin and false descriptions forbidden," 15 U.S.C. 
? 1125 (1994), but it is noteworthy that the text of the section does nothing more than create a 
private right of action for injunctive relief and damages in favor of persons injured by such 
advertising. 
210. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). On one view, a property rule differs from a 
liability rule in that the former is enforceable through an action for an injunction, whereas the 
latter is enforceable only in an action for damages. See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 
1089, 1105-15 (1972). Under this test, in the light of Ex parte Young and ? 1983, an individual 
would possess a property right against a state unless the statute imposing the obligation 
affirmatively denies an action for injunctive relief against an officer. 
211. It is perhaps awkward to say of the false-advertising plaintiff what the Court in College 
Savings Bank said of the trademark owner: that "he can [prohibit] others from using" the putative 
property. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224 (emphasis added). If so, it is because of a 
deficiency in our language, not a deficiency in the former's rights as compared to the latter. 
Although we say that A has a right to prohibit B from " using" A's trademark, B does not " use" 
A's trademark in the same way he might use, say, A's automobile. "Use" of the trademark 
consists in creating another manifestation of the symbol and affixing it to a product. Such use is 
thus at bottom merely the performance of acts prohibited (or made tortious) by the law. C 
similarly has a right to prohibit B from "using" false statements exaggerating the quality of B's 
competing products or maligning the quality of C's products. 
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the patentholder of his patent, or even of the rights reflected in the patent 
(namely, the right to prohibit competitors from employing a specified 
technique). The patentholder possesses his patent and his right after the 
state's infringement, just as he did before. What the infringement deprives 
the patentholder of are the profits he expected to earn as a result of the 
monopoly to which the patent entitled him.212 Expected profits, however, 
are precisely what a Lanham Act plaintiff claims he was deprived of by a 
state's false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act.213 The Court has 
also found trade secrets-" one of the weakest forms of intellectual 
property"24 -to be "property" for purposes of the Takings Clause.215 
" [T]o be the owner of a trade secret means only that one can recover tort- 
like remedies for a breach of promise and contract or unjust enrichment-like 
remedies for a tort." 216 Much the same can be said of the right to be free 
from false advertising.217 
It is even more difficult to see how other, seemingly uncontroversial 
sorts of property rights involve a "right to prohibit others from using" 
212. See Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Indus., 251 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 1958). 
213. The Court in College Savings Bank suggested at one point that the plaintiff's problem 
was not that it lacked property, but that the state did not deprive him of it. See College Sav. Bank, 
119 S. Ct. at 2225 (" [N]ot everything which protects property interests is designed to remedy or 
prevent deprivations of those property interests."). This suggests that the Court was relying on 
past cases that seemed to indicate that the Due Process Clause is implicated only when the 
deprivation is caused directly by the state, rather than indirectly. See Terrell, supra note 165, at 
919-20 (discussing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980)). If the Court was suggesting that 
the state did not directly cause the plaintiff's loss of expected profits because the loss depended on 
the intervening decisions of clients, the argument would appear to apply equally to the 
patentholder's claim of infringement by the state. In any event, the cases that suggest a distinction 
between direct and indirect causation are best read to incorporate a proximate-cause standard. See 
id. The Lanham Act entitles a plaintiff to compensation only for injuries proximately caused by 
the false advertiser's actions. 
214. Heald & Wells, supra note 144, at 856. 
215. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984). 
216. Heald & Wells, supra note 144, at 860. 
217. Professor Merrill argues that his insistence that the right to exclude is the sine qua non 
of property can accommodate the status as property of " some of the most quintessential interests 
of the modern capitalist state-bank accounts, bonds, commercial paper, common stock, and the 
like," which he also describes as "choses in action." Merrill, supra note 195, at 750-51. His 
explanation shows that he understands the "right to exclude" to exist whenever the law protects 
the putative property interest through tort-like remedies: 
The only value reflected in these interests [i.e., bank accounts, bonds, and stocks] is 
their exchange value .... And their exchange value is fully protected by the law 
against interference by others. These interests are protected by criminal rules against 
theft and by civil actions for misappropriation, fraud, etc. These legal rules function in 
a manner directly parallel to the laws against trespass that protect land and the actions 
for theft and replevin that protect chattels. In effect, therefore, the law of theft (together 
with its cognate civil actions) gives the holders of interests in choses in action the right 
to exclude others from interfering with the exchange value of these interests, and that is 
all one needs to give them the status of property. 
Id. at 751. The Lanham Act does not impose criminal penalties for false advertising, but if 
provision for such penalties were regarded as necessary to give people a right to compensation 
from the state, Congress could easily add them. 
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something.218 For example, the Court noted in College Savings Bank that 
"[t]he assets of a business (including its goodwill) unquestionably are 
property." 219 Certainly, a business's tables and chairs satisfy the "right to 
exclude" test, as others can be prohibited from using them. But is it fair to 
say that a person can be prohibited from " using" another's goodwill? To be 
sure, one way A can deprive B of B's goodwill is to try to pass itself off as 
B, perhaps by using its trademark. In this respect, the right to goodwill 
seems identical to the right to a trademark. But A can also deprive B of 
goodwill by making false statements about B. At oral argument, Justice 
Scalia appeared willing to grant that A deprives B of a property right when 
it does this.220 It seems clear that A also deprives B of goodwill if the two 
are competitors and A makes false statements exaggerating its own 
product's quality. A false statement exaggerating the quality of one product 
can be expected to diminish the market for directly competing products. 
That is why the statement is made. Moreover, this is the only circumstance 
in which B would have a cause of action against A. The cases confirm that 
A deprives B of goodwill when it makes false claims about its own product 
that succeed in diminishing the demand for B's product or services.22' 
218. Much of the difficulty in describing the interest protected by the Lanham Act in terms of 
a "right to exclude" lies in the lack of a term for the "thing" from which the "owner" of that 
right is excluding others. For this reason, one might object that these interests are not "property" 
because they "are not discrete 'things' at all." Terrell, supra note 181, at 514; see also id. at 514 
n.90 ("The necessity for a 'thing' of some sort is of course critical not only to the central case of 
private property or ownership, but to any of the cases in the property set. Without it, one of the 
necessary dimensions of the concept is missing."). But, again, the deficiency seems to be one of 
language, not of rights. In the case of all rights in intellectual property, perhaps all intangible 
property rights, the " thing" that is regarded as property is " some ideational abstraction or other." 
J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 45 (1996). In some cases, we have a word for the 
abstraction that provides the object for a sentence taking the form "X has a right to exclude [or 
prohibit] others from using ...." That there is no similar word for the right protected by the false- 
advertising provisions of the Lanham Act should not obscure the fact that the plaintiff's rights 
under those provisions are analytically the same as his rights under provisions that do supply a 
word for the abstraction. 
219. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 
2219, 2225 (1999). Though the Court did not cite any authority for this concession, it could have 
cited many cases, including Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 13 (1949). 
Authorities are collected in 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION ? 2:20, at 2-41 n. 1 (4th ed. 1996); Floyd A. Wright, The Nature and Basis 
of Legal Goodwill, 24 ILL. L. REV. 20, 21 & n.4 (1929) (" [T]here has been a considerable degree 
of uniformity in treating goodwill as property."). But cf Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (finding that injury to reputation does not implicate a property or liberty interest). Paul is 
discussed infra note 256. 
220. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, College Sav. Bank (No. 98-149), 
available in 1999 WL 252691, at *7. 
221. See, e.g., Alpo Petfoods v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 960, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Thomas, J.). Indeed, before it was amended in 1988, the Lanham Act gave A a cause of action 
against B for false advertising only if B exaggerated the qualities of its own products, leaving it to 
the common law to protect A from B's false statements about A's products. Yet during this period 
it was well established that harm to goodwill was one of the measures of damages available to A. 
See U.S. Healthcare v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914, 921-23 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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That, of course, was precisely the property right that the plaintiff was 
claiming in College Savings Bank, yet the Court found that the plaintiff 
lacked a property interest. The Court distinguished the " assets of a business 
(including its good will)" from "the activity of doing business, or the 
activity of making a proft."222 The latter, the Court said, were the only 
things of the plaintiff s upon which the defendant's false advertising 
" impinged," 223 and those activities, the Court said, are "not property in the 
ordinary sense." 224 But the Court appears to have drawn a false dichotomy. 
The false advertising " impinged" upon the plaintiff s " activity of making a 
profit," but it also impinged upon its goodwill, which is a pecuniary interest 
whose measure is the present value of the expected profits that the 
plaintiff s good name could be expected to generate in the future.225 
The Court in College Savings Bank considered and appeared to reject 
the argument that "all civil rights of a pecuniary nature are property 
rights."226 It interpreted the statement in International News Service that 
" equity treats any civil right of a pecuniary nature as a property right" 227 as 
a statement about a quirk of equity jurisprudence: Equity "treats" such 
rights as property rights even though they really are not. In the end, though, 
the Court conceded that the pecuniary right involved in International News 
Service was indeed a property right. It thus left us without an example of a 
pecuniary right that is not a property right, other than the right the plaintiff 
claimed in College Savings Bank. Since, as we have seen, the reasons the 
Court offered for distinguishing this right from conceded property rights are 
unpersuasive, we are left to search for other possible distinctions. 
The defendant's conduct was alleged to have "impinged" upon the 
plaintiff's expected profits. Profits are money, and money is quintessential 
property. A persuasive distinction would thus isolate the factors that 
distinguish such lost profits from money in the bank. Perhaps the key 
difference is that lost profits are by definition money that the plaintiff does 
not possess. Does lack of possession explain why the plaintiff lacked 
property? 
The Court's decision last Term in American Manufacturers Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Sullivan228 suggests that possession may be important. The 
relevant state law in that case entitled plaintiffs to compensation for 
222. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2225. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. See generally Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 17 & n.9 (1949); 
Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 219 (9th Cir. 1957); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 219, 
?? 2:17, 2:21; Note, An Inquiry into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 660, 677-82 
(1953). 
226. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2225. 
227. Id. (quoting International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918)). 
228. 119 S. Ct. 977 (1999). 
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" reasonable" medical expenses, but it went on to provide that if the insurer 
disputed the reasonableness of the expense, the matter would be submitted 
to an impartial tribunal and the insurer would not have to pay until the 
tribunal determined that the expense was reasonable. The plaintiffs argued 
that the procedure did not afford them due process, but the Court held that 
the procedure did not deprive the plaintiffs of a property right. In its 
opinion, the Court emphasized that the plaintiffs' right to receive payment 
from the defendants would "attach" only after the plaintiffs cleared the 
procedural hurdles set forth in the statute. The Court distinguished 
Goldberg v. Kelly and Mathews v. Eldridge-cases in which the Court had 
held that an individual had a property right to receive a future stream of 
welfare payments-on the ground that "[i]n both cases, an individual's 
entitlement to benefits had been established, and the question presented was 
whether predeprivation notice and a hearing were required before the 
individual's interest in continued payment of benefits could be 
terminated."229 Does this suggest that the Due Process Clause protects 
persons against state action that takes away something the person already 
possesses, but not against state action that denies them something they do 
not possess? 
A closer look at American Manufacturers shows that the Court did not 
so hold. First, the benefits claimed by the plaintiffs in Goldberg and 
Mathews were not in their possession; indeed, they were not even yet due 
and payable to them. If the plaintiffs had been litigating about past-due 
benefits, the suit would have been dismissed on Eleventh Amendment 
grounds.30 What the plaintiffs did possess was an administrative or judicial 
decision " establishing" that they had been eligible for such benefits in the 
past. The state claimed that they were no longer eligible, and the Court held 
that it could terminate future payments only after a hearing. Despite the 
Court's emphasis in American Manufacturers that the right to benefits had 
already been "established" in Goldberg and Mathews, the Court did not 
hold that someone who claims to be eligible for benefits under the law but 
does not yet possess an administrative or judicial determination of 
eligibility lacks a property right. If it had, its holding would have 
contradicted clear precedent. As already noted, it is well established that a 
cause of action is a property right.231 The reason is not hard to perceive. If a 
cause of action were not a property right until the claimant's entitlement to 
damages had been judicially " established," a plaintiff would not be entitled 
to due process of law until after he had won his case. A judge who decided 
a case against a plaintiff by the flip of a coin, or pursuant to a stated policy 
229. Id. at 990. 
230. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
231. See cases cited supra note 91. 
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of always ruling for the defendant, would be violating no constitutionally 
guaranteed right to due process. That would be absurd. It is commonly, and 
rightly, understood that plaintiffs are entitled to due process at trial.232 
That American Manufacturers does not hold otherwise is confirmed by 
a footnote stating that "[respondents do not contend that they have a 
property interest in their claims for payment, as distinct from the payments 
themselves."233 Had the respondents relied on their claim to payment as 
their property right, they would presumably have lost on the ground that 
the state does not " deprive" a person of a claim until the proceedings to 
determine the merits of the claim are concluded.234 The Court's holding that 
postponing the payment until the end of the proceeding does not violate due 
process was thus fully consistent with the principle that the Due Process 
Clause ordinarily requires a predeprivation hearing.235 But that is not to say 
that no property right existed before the end of the proceeding. The 
claimant possessed a property right in the claim, and that is why he was 
entitled to a hearing and fair procedures to claim the money, as Justice 
Ginsburg emphasized in her concurrence.236 Similarly, someone with an as- 
yet-unestablished claim to welfare benefits, like any other plaintiff, should 
be entitled to a hearing and the fair procedures guaranteed by the Due 
Process Clause to establish her eligibility for such benefits.237 She is just not 
entitled to get the money before her eligibility has been determined.238 
American Manufacturers thus indicates that the money College Savings 
Bank expected to make in the future was not yet its property. But the case is 
consistent with the idea that College Savings Bank possessed a property 
right in its expectation that it would make such money in the future free of 
232. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982) (" The Court 
traditionally has held that the Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the 
courts, either as defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress 
grievances." (citing Soci6te Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); Hammond Packing 
Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 349-51 (1909); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897); Windsor v. 
McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876))). 
233. American Mfrs., 119 S. Ct. at 990 n. 13. The concurring opinion of Justice Breyer, joined 
by Justice Souter, emphasized this concession. See id. at 991 (Breyer, J., concurring in part). 
234. The "state" defendants in American Manufacturers were local government officials, 
whose actions are state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes but not for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes. See V6zquez, supra note 14, at 1704 n.100. The plaintiffs thus would not 
have lost on the ground (discussed further below) that, in the light of Seminole Tribe and Alden, 
individuals have no right of action for retrospective monetary relief against the state. 
235. On the latter principle, see, for example, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1989), which 
holds that predeprivation procedural safeguards hould normally be required before an involuntary 
confinement of a mental patient. 
236. See American Mfrs., 119 S. Ct. at 991 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part). 
237. But cf id. at 990-91 n.13 (reserving the question and citing Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 
942 (1986); and Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 n.8 (1985)). 
238. Goldberg's holding that someone who has previously been found eligible for such 
benefits is entitled by the Due Process Clause to a hearing before the stream of benefits is 
terminated is discussed further infra Section III.C. 
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false advertising by competitors, even state competitors.239 Indeed, as 
already noted, "goodwill" -which the Court said was "unquestionably" 
property-is the term we use to describe that stream of future profits, just as 
" chose in action" is the term we use to describe a plaintiff s right to receive 
money from the defendant if he prevails in litigation.240 Its status as 
property is not vitiated by the fact that the plaintiff does not yet possess the 
money or the fact that the right to it has not yet been reduced to judgment or 
otherwise "established." 241 
The Court in College Savings Bank appears to have believed that B 
deprives A of property when B makes false statements about A's product, 
but not when B makes false statements about B's. If so, the Court's 
distinction does not have to do with "what" the defendant deprived the 
plaintiff of (in both cases it is future profits), but turns instead on more 
abstract features of the defendant's obligation towards the plaintiff, and the 
plaintiff's correlative right vis-a-vis the defendant. A distinction between 
the obligation not to make false statements about one's own products and 
the obligation not to make false statements about those of one's competitors 
may find some support in traditional conceptions of property. A traditional 
attribute of property-one that is, indeed, closely associated with, and 
perhaps traceable to, the right to exclude-is that the owner can give it 
away or (what may be the same thing) license its use.242 One can say that A 
has the right to license B to malign A's product (that is, by failing to bring a 
lawsuit, or perhaps by agreeing in advance not to do so), but it is 
more difficult to say that A has the right to license B to exaggerate the 
quality of B's product; under the law, all competitors injured by such 
misrepresentations have a cause of action against B. The Court suggested 
that was this was the basis of its holding when it stated, echoing 
Blackstone,243 that the false-advertising provisions of the Lanham Act did 
not confer on the petitioner any right over which it had " exclusive 
dominion." The Court may have meant that the petitioner lacked 
" exclusive dominion" over the right to prevent Florida Prepaid from 
239. As noted earlier, there is no question that the state is prohibited from engaging in false 
advertising. See supra text accompanying note 198. 
240. Because the essence of the latter property right is a right to make a claim in litigation, 
the state does not deprive a plaintiff of a chose in action until the end of the proceeding. A state 
that falsely advertises and injures the goodwill of a competitor, on the other hand, would appear to 
deprive the competitor of his property at the time the false advertising has its intended effect. 
241. Nor is its claim to being property undermined by the fact that its value depends on 
predictions about future events. The value of real estate taken by the state similarly depends on 
predictions about the future, yet real estate is unquestionably property. 
242. See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 80-97 (1997) (discussing the right to 
abandon, transfer, and give away property, and their relation to the right to exclude); Merrill, 
supra note 195, at 743 & n. 43 (same). 
243. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 89, at *2 (famously defining property as "that sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of this world, in 
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe"). 
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exaggerating the quality of its own product because all competitors who 
may be injured by any act of false advertising shared the right to preclude 
such conduct. 
If so, then the Court may have embraced a definition of " property" that 
denies such status to interests that can only be injured through conduct that 
also injures an indeterminate number of others (here, the interest in being 
free from pecuniary injuries resulting from someone else's false statements 
about his own products).2" Denying individual relief for such widespread 
injuries would be consistent with the Court's reference to the principle res 
publica, res nullius,245 and it would accord with views that Justice Scalia 
has expressed in other contexts.246 But this refined "exclusive dominion" 
test is hard to defend by reference to any relevant policies,247 and it would 
be difficult to apply.248 The test also fails to support the Court's 
conclusions. It might be plausible to say that the plaintiff in College 
244. I have formulated the definition this way in order to accommodate such cases as a 
government's decision to flood a large area of land. Such action is clearly a taking of property 
even though the conduct injures a large number of persons. It satisfies the posited definition 
because the interest that constitutes the property can be (although it was not here) injured through 
conduct that does not also injure an indeterminate number of others. 
245. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 
2219, 2224 (1999) (recognizing that "the right that we all possess to use the public lands is not the 
'property' right of anyone"). 
246. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine 
of Standing as an Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 894-97 
(1983). Although there is language in Lujan suggesting that an individual cannot sue to protect the 
" public" interest, see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 ("Vindicating the public interest ... is the function 
of Congress and the Chief Executive."), the actual holding allows such suits if the plaintiff can 
show that she suffered a particularized injury, see id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (indicating that the plaintiffs would have had standing had they 
purchased airplane tickets). 
247. Cf. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
U.S. 669, 688 (1973) ("To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many 
others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions 
could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion."). This aspect of the rule 
might perhaps be said to advance the policy, sometimes ascribed to sovereign immunity law, of 
protecting state treasuries. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1999). The broader the 
class of injured people, the greater the threat to state treasuries. This is unconvincing, however, as 
the executive branch remains available to seek compensation, and perhaps even punitive relief, for 
widespread injury. A more plausible defense of the rule would be that individual retrospective 
relief is less necessary in the case of widespread injury because the executive is more likely to sue 
to enforce such obligations. See Vazquez, supra note 3. Professor Jackson has suggested that the 
rule permitting prospective but not retrospective relief, even though prospective relief is just as 
costly (perhaps more so), may be justified on the ground that prospective relief is likely to benefit 
society in general, whereas retrospective relief benefits only discrete people, whose interests may 
well be adverse to that of the general public. See Jackson, supra note 19, at 91. This analysis 
would suggest that compensation should be available in precisely those cases in which the 
interpretation of "property" discussed in the text would make it unavailable to individuals (that is, 
when the injury caused by the state's unlawful action is widespread). 
248. The Court's attempts to draw similar lines in the context of standing have resulted in a 
doctrine that is widely regarded as incoherent. See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing 
and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1372-73 (1988) (citing judicial and 
scholarly authority for the proposition that standing doctrine is incoherent). 
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Savings Bank lacked exclusive dominion over the defendant's obligation 
not to make false statements about its own products, but it is less clear that 
the plaintiff lacked exclusive dominion over its right to be free of injury as 
a result of such conduct. Such individuated injury, when it occurs, is 
normally enough to confer standing, even if many others have been 
similarly harmed. Moreover, the cause of action for damages that results 
when such injury occurs is regarded as a property right. While it is true that 
Alden holds that individuals do not have a cause of action for damages 
against states who violate duties imposed pursuant to Article I, Florida 
Prepaid shows that the absence of such a cause of action does not negate 
the existence of a property right. College Savings Bank itself recognizes 
that goodwill is property, and, as already discussed, the plaintiff was 
alleging an injury to its goodwill (defined as a legitimate expectation of 
future profits). In short, the conclusion that the plaintiff lacked exclusive 
dominion over the defendant's conduct fails to explain why the plaintiff 
was not suing to protect a property right, or why the Lanham Act does not 
" remedy or prevent deprivations of . . . property interests. "249 
In any event, if this is the line drawn by College Savings Bank, the 
definition of property would remain relatively broad, and hence Florida 
Prepaid would mean that Alden's holding was of narrower significance 
than it appeared to be. Consider the Court's recent decision in Kimel v. 
Board of Regents250 striking down the abrogation of state sovereign 
immunity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).251 The 
ADEA prohibits age discrimination with respect to employment, and it 
applies to the state as employer. If government jobs are property to the 
extent that the law places mandatory limits on the employer's discretion,252 
then someone who is fired from such a job or otherwise injured in violation 
of the ADEA would seem to have a due process right to compensatory 
relief.253 The job-and even the more abstract right to be free from 
discrimination-would appear to be property under the "exclusive 
dominion" test. The same would be true of the rights to accrued wages 
claimed by the employees in Alden,254 and indeed of the rights created by 
249. College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2225; see also supra note 213. 
250. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000). 
251. 29 U.S.C.A. ?? 621-634 (West Supp. 1999). 
252. See supra notes 176-179 and accompanying text. 
253. Someone subjected to unlawful discrimination in the hiring process might have a more 
tenuous claim to a property right in the job. If she can show that she would have gotten the job but 
for the unlawful discrimination, however, it seems difficult to distinguish her expectation of a job 
from a business's expectation of future profits. Moreover, she would appear to have exclusive 
dominion over the defendant's obligation not to discriminate against her. But cf. infra note 254 (discussing the government's power to enforce this obligation without the employee's consent). 
254. There is one feature of the FLSA and of the federal laws prohibiting discrimination in 
employment hat may require the conclusion that their violation does not constitute a deprivation 
of property under the test discussed in the text. The FLSA gives the Secretary of Labor the power 
to maintain an action against the employer without prior written request of the employee. See 
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many, perhaps most, congressional statutes that establish a right of action 
for damages.255 
In short, if College Savings Bank holds that the right involved in the 
case was not " property" because it could be violated only through conduct 
that similarly injured an indeterminate number of others, then it does 
not narrow the scope of the Due Process Clause significantly. Indeed, 
the Court's recognition that goodwill is "unquestionably" property may 
broaden it a bit.256 On the other hand, the test would be difficult to apply in 
many contexts, and it would produce anomalous results. Although Justice 
Scalia may well have had this rule in mind, it is far from clear that all of the 
members of the majority would embrace such a test.257 
Donovan v. Brown Equip. & Serv. Tools, 666 F.2d 148, 156 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1982). Similarly, 
under the federal antidiscrimination laws, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may 
bring an action against an employer even if the employee does not consent. See 42 U.S.C. 
? 2000e-5 (1994). Thus, in neither case does the employee have the ability to license the employer 
to violate the law. This illustrates another anomaly about the proposed test: A provision designed 
to make the statute more effective in protecting the interests of the employees has the effect of 
denying the relevant rights the status of property, and hence of limiting the employee's rights 
when the employer is the state. For this reason, the posited test seems implausible to the extent 
that it would deny an employee's right the status of property on the ground that the government 
has been given the power to enforce it. It seems more sensible to assimilate the government's 
power in such circumstances to a guardian's power to defend the property of a child in court. In 
any event, if this were the only reason violations of these laws did not deprive employees of 
property, Congress could cure the problem by amending the statute to provide that the relevant 
agencies may bring actions under these laws against the states only if the relevant employees 
consent. An earlier version of the FLSA allowed the Secretary of Labor to bring suit only "when 
requested by [the affected employees] to do so." Donovan, 666 F.2d at 156. 
255. An exception might be the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. ?? 12101-12213 
(1994), which imposes some obligations on states the violation of which would affect an 
indeterminate number of persons with disabilities. 
256. Before College Savings Bank, some lower courts had ruled, in reliance on Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693 (1976), that goodwill is not a property right. See WMX Techs. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 
367, 374-75 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that allowing recovery for loss of goodwill is "contrary to the 
basic thrust of Paul v. Davis"); Cypress Ins. Co. v. Clark, 144 F.3d 1435, 1436 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(stating that an allegation of a loss of goodwill "must be accompanied by a constitutionally 
recognized injury"). The Court in Paul held that a person's reputation is not by itself property, see 
Paul, 424 U.S. at 701, and the lower courts have equated goodwill with reputation. Paul has of 
course been severely criticized, see, e.g., ELY, supra note 165, at 19 & n.31; Jeffries, supra note 
134, at 78-79; Monaghan, supra note 166, at 423-29, and for good reason. Justice Scalia's 
statement that goodwill is "unquestionably" property (and apparently self-evidently as well, as 
the Court cited no authority) shows just how counterintuitive the Paul holding was, and may 
signal a rejection of that much criticized decision. Alternatively, Paul could be squared with 
College Savings Bank if interpreted narrowly as a holding that noneconomic injury to reputation is 
not property. Goodwill, by contrast, reflects the economic value of reputation. Such an 
interpretation derives support from the Court's description of Davis's claimed injury as purely 
stigmatic. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 711-12. Additionally, the Court in Paul emphasized that there 
was no law that "extend[ed] to the respondent any legal guarantee of present enjoyment of 
reputation." Id. at 711. By contrast, there is a law, the Lanham Act, that guaranteed College 
Savings Bank freedom from economic injury resulting from the state's false advertising. 
257. For example, Justice Kennedy was unwilling to go entirely along with Justice Scalia's 
similar analysis in Lujan. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579-80 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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While the Court'.s specific holding-that the plaintiff in College 
Savings Bank did not possess a property interest that was infringed by the 
state-raises more questions than it answers and thus may be of limited 
precedential value, there is a strong indication in the opinion of a basic 
change in the Court's approach to defining property, and the Court's new 
approach bodes ill for the Court's "new property" jurisprudence. As noted, 
the Court's earlier cases emphasized that the concepts of liberty and 
property are broad and majestic and "gather meaning from experience." 258 
Cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly appeared to reflect a conscious decision to 
treat certain rights as property rights for purposes of the Due Process 
Clause, even though they had not before been regarded as such.259 In 
College Savings Bank, however, as already noted, the Court distinguished a 
prior case that had indicated that " equity treats any civil right of a 
pecuniary nature as a property right" as a statement that equity treats them 
as property rights even though they are not really such.260 The Court's 
indication that something either is or is not really a property right, when 
accompanied by its importation of Takings Clause standards into the due 
process inquiry, suggests a drastic narrowing of the scope of the Due 
Process Clause. It suggests that the Court may be poised to reject the cases, 
such as Goldberg, in which it decided to treat certain rights as property 
rights even though, from a historical perspective, they properly were not. 
C. Alden and the Right to Accrued Wages 
A comparison of the right involved in Alden with the right involved in 
Goldberg shows either that, under the holding of Florida Prepaid, the 
Alden plaintiffs would have been entitled under the Due Process Clause to 
the relief the Court in Alden denied them, or that the Court now rejects its 
"new property" jurisprudence.26' The law provided that persons who 
258. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting); see also supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
259. See Merrill, supra note 195, at 752 (" Goldberg and its progeny are clearly decisions 
designed to expand the scope of due process protection for instrumental ends."). 
260. See supra notes 226-227 and accompanying text. 
261. Professor Woolhandler finds the conflict between the Court's approach to defining 
property in College Savings Bank and the "new property" cases so manifest that she interprets 
last Term's cases as adopting a distinction between "old property" and "new property." See 
Woolhandler, supra note 3. For "old" property, she argues, Florida Prepaid establishes that the 
states are required to provide a retroactive remedy, whereas for "new" property such as was 
involved in College Savings Bank, the states are required to provide fair procedures but not a 
backward-looking remedy. See id. This would certainly be a way to avoid the most disturbing 
implications of College Savings Bank. But the Court did not purport o be drawing a line between 
old and new property. Rather, it held that the bank did not have a property right for purposes of 
the Due Process Clause. It is thus difficult to interpret he decision as preserving some procedural 
protections in suits involving new property. If it had meant to say instead that the Due Process 
Clause requires less process in cases involving false advertising, it could have struck down the 
abrogation of sovereign immunity in the Lanham Act on the same ground that it struck down the 
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performed work under certain conditions were entitled to a certain level of 
payment. The plaintiffs had performed the work and were seeking the 
payment. Was their right to accrued wages a property interest? They appear 
to have had a legitimate expectation that they would be paid such amounts 
if they performed the work. Indeed, if they had sought an injunction on an 
Ex parte Young theory or under ? 1983, the Eleventh Amendment would 
have been no bar.262 If their employer had been a private company, they 
would have had a claim against the employer for the past-due wages, and 
such a claim, as we have seen, would be a property right under existing case 
law. Because their employer was the state, they had no cause of action, as 
Alden itself holds. But Florida Prepaid indicates that, notwithstanding 
sovereign immunity, the state must afford a remedy for illegal deprivations 
of property, and the case establishes that a property right may exist against 
abrogation in the patent law. Moreover, as discussed above, it is difficult to distinguish the interest 
of which the petitioner was deprived in College Savings Bank from the interest involved in 
Florida Prepaid. It is thus hard to see why the former falls in the "new property" category, while 
the latter is " old property." See Jackson, Principle and Compromise, supra note 3. 
The attitude toward the new property cases of the members of the Court's Eleventh 
Amendment majority is illustrated by a recent exchange at an oral argument. In response to a 
lawyer's invocation of Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), Chief Justice 
Rehnquist quipped that Logan was "way out on the margin." The lawyer promptly agreed and 
withdrew his reliance on the case. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, United States 
v. Martinez-Salazar (submitted Nov. 29, 1999) (No. 98-1255), available in 1999 WL 1134649, at 
*42; see also U.S. Supreme Court Official Transcript, Baker v. General Motors Co., 522 U.S. 222 
(1998) (No. 96-653), available in 1997 WL 638425, at *16 ("I don't think you'll find much 
disposition on the Court to enlarge Logan v. Zimmerman."). 
262. See 42 U.S.C. ? 1983 (1994); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). No such injunction 
was necessary in Alden, because the states had concededly come into compliance with the FLSA 
by the time of the lawsuit. 
It appears that the FLSA, as currently written, authorizes employees to obtain such 
injunctions only if the state is alleged to be violating its provisions concerning retaliatory 
discharge. See 29 U.S.C. ? 216(b) (1994) (authorizing suits by employees for "legal or equitable 
relief" for violation of the prohibition of retaliatory discharge). It authorizes the Secretary of 
Labor to seek an injunction requiring compliance with the FLSA's other provisions, see id. ? 217, 
and it authorizes employees to sue for money damages for violations of minimum-wage and 
minimum-hour provisions, see id. ? 216(b). The FLSA's failure to authorize employees to obtain 
injunctive relief against employers who violate the minimum-wage and minimum-hour provisions 
may well preclude such relief against state officials under an Ex parte Young theory or under 
? 1983. Cf Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996) (finding prospective relief 
unavailable under Ex parte Young if such relief would be incompatible with the statutory scheme); 
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) 
(finding the same under ? 1983). But cf. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 
U.S. 418, 425 (1987) (finding a strong presumption that relief under ? 1983 is not barred by a 
statute creating substantive rights). Professor Meltzer has expressed the view that Congress would 
have to amend the FLSA to authorize employees to obtain injunctive relief against officials. See 
Meltzer, supra note 3. If the only reason the employees in Alden lacked a property interest in their 
accrued wages (and hence a right to compensatory relief) was, ironically, that the statute entitled 
them only to backpay, cf. supra note 210 (citing authority for the proposition that property exists 
if the rightholder may seek specific performance), Congress could easily fix the problem by 
authorizing injunctive relief. But cf. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2225 (finding that the 
petitioner lacked a property interest even though the relevant statute entitled it to injunctive relief). 
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the state even if sovereign immunity would otherwise protect the state from 
damage suits. 
Do employees who are legally entitled to be paid a minimum wage 
have a property interest in their past-due wages separate from the cause of 
action Congress purported to give them? If the answer is no, it is driven by 
the demands of the sovereign immunity doctrine, not by any coherent 
understanding of the concept of property. The employees clearly had a 
substantive right to the wages. As noted, state sovereign immunity would 
not bar a suit for prospective relief under Ex parte Young or ? 1983 (unless 
Congress is deemed to have forbidden it).263 Yet prospective relief would 
necessarily rest on the proposition that they had a right to be paid such 
wages in the future when and if they performed the work.2M It seems 
incoherent to say that before earning the wages, the employees had a 
conditional right to be paid such wages, but, having satisfied the condition, 
they now have no right to the wages. 
Admittedly, the employees' right to prospective relief does not show 
that the employees had a property right in their accrued wages. Section 
1983 authorizes prospective relief to enforce federal rights even if they are 
not property rights. It would be consistent with the availability of 
prospective relief to say that a right to money is not a property right unless 
it is accompanied by a right to maintain an action against the employer in 
court. If so, the employees would lack a property right in their accrued 
wages because sovereign immunity denies them a cause of action. But this 
conclusion would be inconsistent with Florida Prepaid and other cases in 
which a property right was found to have been created against a state by 
federal legislation enacted under Article 1.265 In the light of Seminole Tribe 
and Alden, all such cases establish that the existence of a property right 
against the state does not turn on the putative property holder's capacity to 
enforce the right against the state in court. Alden's right to accrued wages is 
distinguishable from conceded property rights, such as causes of action, 
solely on the ground that, because of sovereign immunity, he lacked the 
capacity to maintain an action in court for money damages after the right 
263. Any such conclusion would be questionable. At any rate, Congress can easily fix that 
problem if doing so were necessary to entitle employees to compensatory relief against the state 
on a due process theory. 
264. Prospective relief would be available only if the plaintiff could show that the act or 
omission threatened by the defendant, if carried out, would infringe the plaintiffs federal rights. 
265. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 
(1970). This standard also seems inconsistent with the cases holding that the Due Process Clause 
is itself sometimes the source of a remedial obligation, and with the decisions establishing that the 
contours of a property right, and thus of a state's procedural obligations under the Due Process 
Clause, are not subject to the procedural imits the state has established in creating the right. See 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (rejecting Justice Rehnquist's "bitter 
with the sweet" doctrine). 
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had accrued. If such capacity is not a sine qua non of property, it seems to 
follow that Alden's right to accrued wages is property. 
The conclusion that state employees lack a property right in their 
accrued wages once they have earned them conflicts even more clearly with 
the "new property" cases. In those cases, persons who had been receiving 
benefits in the past obtained an injunction in the federal courts prohibiting 
the state from failing to pay them benefits due in the future without first 
holding a hearing to establish their ineligibility for the benefits. In 
upholding that relief, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had a property 
interest in their benefits. Analytically, benefits seem indistinguishable from 
accrued wages: They are both statutorily grounded rights to receive money 
from the state. If the former is a property right, then it seems difficult to 
deny that status to the latter.266 Although the benefits at issue in Goldberg 
were unaccrued, Alden need not claim that unaccrued benefits are property. 
The plaintiffs in Goldberg would have been entitled to prospective relief 
only if they could show that a violation of their federal rights was 
threatened. The federal right at issue was the right to due process, a right 
that exists only with respect to "property" and "liberty."267 The plaintiffs 
in these cases thus had to show not only that they had a right to receive 
benefits once the benefits accrued, but also that what they were claiming 
they were eligible for would, once accrued, be a property right.268 The " new 
property" cases thus establish that someone who has an accrued right to 
money from the state has a property right, notwithstanding the state's 
sovereign immunity. If so, then the Due Process Clause, as construed in 
Florida Prepaid, required the state to afford an adequate remedy to the 
plaintiffs in Alden.269 
266. I doubt that the Court would seek to distinguish the right to benefits from the right to 
wages because of the former's importance, or on some similar ground. College Savings Bank 
purports to rest on notions about the essence of a property right. If this essence turns on history or 
tradition, the most plausible basis for distinguishing between the two would be the long- 
discredited distinction between rights and privileges. A resurrection of that distinction, however, 
would lead the Court to conclude that accrued wages are property, but that welfare benefits or 
continued government employment is not. 
267. The benefits in Goldberg and Mathews had their sources in both federal and state law, 
but the plaintiffs were suing to enforce their constitutional due process rights. The Court would 
presumably have decided those cases the same way had the benefits been entirely creatures of 
state law. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. 977, 982 (1999) (considering a 
due process claim in the context of state-created benefits and distinguishing Goldberg and 
Mathews on other grounds). Where the benefits are creatures of state law, the only conceivable 
basis for federal-court relief under ? 1983 would be the due process claim, which turns on the 
conclusion that a right to the benefits, once accrued, is a property right. 
268. Because they were litigating about the timing of the right to a hearing concerning 
eligibility, the Goldberg plaintiffs did not in fact have to show that they would have been eligible 
for the benefits in the future, but the resolution of the case does rest on the conclusion that what 
they were claiming they were eligible for is a property right once accrued. 
269. As discussed in Part II, the Court in Florida Prepaid made it clear that a state 
"deprives" persons of property only when it acts willfully. See supra text accompanying note 
108. As discussed above, this may mean that a deprivation does not occur if the federal law that 
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American Manufacturers suggests that the Court might distinguish the 
right involved in Goldberg from the right involved in Alden on the ground 
that the right of the welfare recipient to benefits had already been 
established by an administrative agency or court, while the employees' 
right to the wages had not been. As noted above, even without an 
administrative or judicial decree, an employee would have a property right 
against a private employer who failed to pay accrued wages. But that 
property right takes the form of a cause of action, and a state employee 
lacks a cause of action because the state is immune. Perhaps the Court 
would say that employees or welfare recipients have a property right in 
wages or benefits once they accrue only if they also have an administrative 
or judicial decree establishing their right, but otherwise they have, at best, 
merely a cause of action. If the entity that owes the benefits or wages is 
immune, however, there would be no cause of action and thus no property 
right. 
Again, this standard would accommodate the sovereign immunity 
cases, but only by molding the definition of property around them. Yet this 
standard too would conflict with the cases. A patent might be property 
under this test because the process of procuring a patent includes 
the issuance of a document by an administrative agency (a sort of 
administrative "establishment" of the right). But trademark rights based 
on the common law, or rights under federal law based on an unregistered 
copyright, would appear not to be protected. This conflicts with the 
suggestion in College Savings Bank that trademarks and copyrights are 
property, as well as with cases finding that trade secrets are property.270 
Indeed, the Court's concession that goodwill is property contradicts the 
claim that prior adjudication is a necessary element of a property right.271 
American Manufacturers recognizes that someone whose eligibility for past 
installments has been judicially or administratively established is entitled to 
be paid future installments even if he is substantively ineligible for them 
unless his ineligibility has been established through specified procedures. It 
does not hold or even imply that someone who claims to be owed money 
the state violated was not "clearly established." See supra text accompanying notes 124-127. If 
so, then the plaintiffs in Alden might have lost their Due Process claim on that ground, as the state 
apparently disputed its legal obligation on the facts. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2269 
(1999) (describing the parties' respective positions when the suit was commenced as "an initial 
good-faith disagreement about the requirements of the FLSA"). But cf. supra text accompanying 
notes 124-127 (discussing whether a due process right to compensation for deprivation of property 
is subject to an exception for deprivations that violate not-clearly-established law). 
270. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984). 
271. The Court could, I suppose, hold that prior judicial or administrative "establishment" of 
eligibility is necessary only if the claimed property right is a right to moneyfrom the state, but this 
would make it entirely transparent that the sovereign immunity tail is wagging the due process 
dog. 
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for work already performed lacks a property right until after his right to the 
money has been established. 
In sum, the new property cases appear to require the conclusion that the 
right to accrued wages involved in Alden was a property right within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause, and that the state was thus required by 
that clause to afford an adequate remedy in its own courts. If accrued wages 
and goodwill are property rights, however, then Alden's holding that states 
need not entertain suits against themselves in their own courts would mean 
very little. If accrued wages are property, then so, it seems, would be any 
unliquidated debt. Louisiana would accordingly have been required by the 
Due Process Clause to provide a remedy against itself for deprivation of its 
debt to Hans. Similarly, the retrospective monetary relief found unavailable 
in federal court in Edelman v. Jordan272 and like cases would be available, 
as a matter of due process, in the state courts. If goodwill is property, then 
the Due Process Clause would appear to require a remedy for any injury (or 
at least any economic injury) resulting from the state's violation of a federal 
statute establishing a right of action for compensatory relief.273 If so, Alden 
would be reduced to holding that states cannot be sued without their 
consent for negligent conduct or for noncompensatory relief. This would 
accord with the idea, supported by past decisions, that the Due Process 
Clause protects "all the interests in personal security . . . which had been 
protected from private interference by the common-law courts."274 But the 
Court in Alden left no doubt that it believed Louisiana was perfectly free to 
deny Hans a remedy against itself in its courts.275 And the Court in College 
Savings Bank appeared to reject the idea that the Due Process Clause 
protects all interests protected by the common law when it quoted Paul v. 
Davis's dictum that the Due Process Clause is not a " font of tort law."276 
If the Court's definition of property in College Savings Bank was 
driven by a perceived need to keep the Due Process Clause from becoming 
a font of tort law and thus gutting its recent sovereign immunity holdings, 
then the Court's project will require it to narrow as well the definition of 
liberty.277 Until recently, the Court basically applied the same test for the 
two concepts, a test that turned on whether the law placed mandatory 
272. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
273. Indeed, the Due Process Clause would require a remedy even if Congress did not create 
a right to compensatory relief. 
274. Monaghan, supra note 166, at 423 (citing Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916), for the 
proposition that the concept of " liberty" embraces all such rights). 
275. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2262-63 (1999). 
276. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 
2219, 2225 (1999) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)). 
277. Cf. Terrell, supra note 181, at 513 (proposing a narrow definition of "property" but a 
broad definition of "liberty" that would include "any ... right relating to use of the court 
system" ). 
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limitations on the state's discretion.278 In Sandin v. Conner, the Court self- 
consciously departed from this approach with respect to the putative liberty 
interests of prisoners, but it indicated that the prior approach "may be 
entirely sensible" with respect to " the rights and remedies available to the 
general public."279 Salvaging the Court's sovereign immunity holdings, 
however, will require a narrowing of liberty for the general public as well. 
The Court's approach to defining " liberty" in Sandin, like its approach 
to " property" in Goldberg and similar cases, was avowedly functional: The 
Court took account of "due process" interests in the context of prison 
litigation and defined liberty to advance them. In College Savings Bank, by 
contrast, the Court purported to look (albeit vainly) for the essence of the 
idea of property. If the Court in fact narrowed the definition of property in 
order to salvage its sovereign immunity precedents, however, its approach 
was in the end just as instrumental as that in Goldberg and Sandin. But 
there would be an important difference (besides lack of candor): The latter 
cases defined property and liberty to advance the goals of the Due Process 
Clause, a clause whose presence in the Constitution is a testament to our 
commitment to the rule of law. College Savings Bank, on the other hand, 
may have defined these concepts in such a way as to accommodate the 
Court's holdings affirming a doctrine that is widely regarded as conflicting 
with the ideal of the rule of law-and, indeed, is closely associated with 
"legal irresponsibility." 280 The latter doctrine has been defended largely on 
historical grounds, most persuasively on grounds of stare decisis.281 
Functional defenses of the doctrine of sovereign immunity have been 
typically confined to the claim that its effects are not so pernicious as to 
justify a departure from precedent.282 College Savings Bank, however, 
suggests that the doctrine is beginning to produce quite pernicious effects 
well beyond the usual sphere of its application. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It seems unlikely that the Court in Alden intended to articulate a 
principle that it understood was being substantially undone on the same day 
by the due process principle articulated in Florida Prepaid. Some of the 
Court's language in College Savings Bank, when considered alongside 
Alden, suggests strongly that the Court means to maintain a robust 
sovereign immunity doctrine by narrowing significantly the definition of 
the "property" protected by the due process principle. The many doctrinal 
278. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,479-80 (1995). 
279. Id. at 481. 
280. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939). 
281. See generally Vdzquez, supra note 11, at 86-88. 
282. See id. at 87. 
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conundrums posed but not directly addressed by the opinions, however, 
indicate that, while the Court may intend to move in this direction, it has 
not completely worked through the implications of its holdings. 
Anticipating Alden three years ago, I suggested in the pages of this 
journal that narrowing the definition of property and liberty would be a bad 
way to address the doctrinal problems that the decision would pose.283 Due 
process is essential to the rule of law. To narrow the scope of the Due 
Process Clause to accommodate sovereign immunity only compounds the 
rule-of-law problems traceable to a doctrine that is already highly suspect 
from a rule-of-law perspective. I suggested an alternative solution to the 
doctrinal problems: Interpret the Due Process Clause as protecting a broad 
range of property and liberty interests and as requiring a hearing (although 
not necessarily a predeprivation hearing) and fair procedures, but not a 
remedy against the state itself. The constitutionally required remedy, I 
suggested, is one against state officials who violate federal law.284 Because 
sovereign immunity, under current doctrine, does not bar suits against state 
officials, an officer-liability regime of constitutional remedies need not be 
designed around the Eleventh Amendment or state sovereign immunity. 
An alternative solution to these doctrinal problems would be to 
abandon the doctrine of sovereign immunity recognized in such cases as 
Seminole Tribe and Alden. In my previous article, I suggested that as long 
as officers remain answerable for the states' violations of federal law, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, as eventually recognized in Alden, would 
be tolerable from a rule-of-law perspective.285 The Court's more recent 
cases, however, require two qualifications. First, the Court's recent 
decisions may signal a contraction of the basic procedural protections 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.286 Second, the Court's sovereign 
immunity and due process decisions have produced a doctrinal maze that, 
with every new case, becomes more bewildering in its complexity. 
Doctrinal complexity is problematic from a rule-of-law perspective. A 
principal point of law is to guide human conduct, and, to this end, a 
measure of certainty and predictability in the law is essential. Constitutional 
doctrine that can be understood, if at all, only with the sorts of conceptual 
pirouettes attempted in Part III of this Essay cannot hope to provide 
meaningful guidance to litigants or lower courts, or even to the Court itself, 
let alone to ordinary citizens. That is unacceptable from a rule-of-law 
perspective. 
283. See Vdzquez, supra note 14, at 1751-53. 
284. See id. at 1770-85. 
285. See id. at 1790-804. 
286. The recent decisions may also signal a contraction of remedies available against state 
officials. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), discussed in Vdzquez, 
supra note 11, at 42-51, 83-94. If so, then denying remedies against the state itself is more 
problematic. See id. 
